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ARTICLES
SUPERWEEDS AND SUSPECT SEEDS: DOES THE
GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED CROP DEREGULATION
PROCESS PUT AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AT RISK?
Margaret Sova McCabe'
"Society stands on the precipice of forever being bound to transgenic
agriculture and transgenic food . .. the future of all food,
and indeed all agriculture [is]at stake. '
I. INTRODUCTION: REGULATING GENETICALLY ENGI-
NEERED CROPS 1986-2012: FOOD AS FUTURE SHOCK3
In early 2012, Maria Rodale, a well-known organic food advocate,'
wrote in The Huffington Post, "[c] hoosing organic is the only way, right
now, that I can make sure I am not feeding my family potentially dan-
gerous biotech ingredients. And although food manufacturers have
done a tobacco-industry worthy job of trying to convince us that [Ge-
netically Modified Organisms] GMOs are safe, the truth is that the
1. Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law and Faculty
Fellow for Food and Society, University of New Hampshire Sustainability
Academy. The author appreciates the opportunity to present this paper at
the Northeastern Law Schools Junior Scholars Meeting, hosted by Boston
College Law School and at the University of Maine School of Law. The
input of colleagues at both events was invaluable. This article was improved
immeasurable by perspective from my UNH Law colleagues, Professors
Erin Corcoran, John Greabe, John Orcutt, and Sophie Sparrow.
2. Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Organic Seed Grow-
ers & Trade Ass'n, v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-civ-2163 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 1,
2011).
3. See generally ALvIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970) (In 1970, futurist Alvin
Toffler's book FUTURE SHOCK introduced the idea that as industrialization
accelerated people would be overcome by change and react with stress).My
own view is that some rejection of GE crops stems from the "culture shock"
technology creates when we feel no longer know our food or how it is
made. Toffler would likely categorize this as "future shock." Id.
4. See Marc Gunther, Is organic food the answer?, MARcGUNTHER.COM (May 22,
2011), http://www.marcgunther.com/2011/05/22/is-organic-food-the-an-
swer/.
109
110 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 1
science is starting to say otherwise."' Is Rodale's reference to the
"truth" of emerging science accurate and if so, why is the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) granting Genetically Engi-
neered (GE) crop deregulation for major crops consumed by animals
and humans? The answer to these questions is the topic of this article.
The answer is complex and is rooted in the American approach to
genetically engineered crop and food regulation, known as "The
Framework."'
As Rodale's opinion illustrates, despite over twenty-five years of
close regulation, GE crops remain controversial in the United States.
Even though America has a quarter century of experience with GE
crop pre-market approval and monitoring processes, many citizens re-
main skeptical of GE crops' safety, especially for human and environ-
mental health.' Indeed, in October 2011, the "Just Label It!" initiative
petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to change its
regulatory approach to GE foods because the GE materials strongly
influence consumer purchasing patterns.9 The 'Just Label It!" website
has now proclaimed the goal of having one million public comments
in support of the petition submitted to the FDA."o
While human health concerns are an important aspect of GE crop
and food regulation, they have not been the focal point of recent legal
issues." Rather, the two issues that have gained courts' attention are:
cross-contamination and superweeds.12 Crop cross-contamination oc-
curs when a conventionally grown crop, such as long-grain rice, is
5. Maria Rodale, just Label It! So We Know Wen it is GMO, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 9, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maria-ro-
dale/just-label-it-so-we-know b_1 193499.html?ref=food&ir=Food.
6. Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986) [hereinafter The Framework];
Food and Drug Administration, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984 (1992) [hereinafter The Policy].
7. JUST LABEL IT!, http://justlabelit.org/ (last visited February 15, 2012) (seek-
ing to submit at least 1 million comments in support of granting the Center
for Food Safety's petition to require labeling of GE foods).
8. See The Debate, JUST LABEL IT!, http://justlabelit.org/about-ge-foods/safety/
(last visited May 15, 2012).
9. Pet. for Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Eng'd Foods, FDA Docket
#2011-P-0723-0001 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/#!searchResults;rpp=10;po=0;s=201 1-P-0723-0001.
10. See Alex Duncan, just Label It: GMO label comments to FDA near 1 million; Add
your voice by March 27, FOOD FREEDOM (Feb. 28, 2012), http://foodfreedom.
wordpress.com/2012/02/28/just-label-it-gmo-label-comments-to-fda-near-
1-million-add-your-voice-by-march-27/.
11. See Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Center for
Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. 11-1310-SC (N.D. Cal. FiledJan. 5, 2012) (plain-
tiff arguing that genetically engineered alfalfa poses significant environ-
mental risks).
12. Id.
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somehow mixed with a GE crop."s The results can be devastating eco-
nomically and environmentally.1 4 For example, in the Liberty Link
Rice case, discussed at length below, foreign trading partners banned
U.S. long-grain rice because it was contaminated with GE material,
which harmed many U.S. rice farmers.'" Superweeds are weeds that
have grown resistant to glyphosate, a widely used herbicide better
known as Round-Up. 6 Superweeds present problems for farmers be-
cause farmers must use more toxic herbicides to eradicate the weeds,
or pull them by hand." Therefore, superweeds may result in greater
use of powerful herbicides affecting the environment generally, and
also requiring increased inputs on the farm thereby raising food pro-
duction costs.'8
However, for every claimed flaw of GE crops there is an equally
compelling claimed attribute. While consumers may reject GE crops
as "frankenfoods,"" these foods also hold great promise. A GE crop
can reduce harmful fats,2 0 increase helpful nutrients,2 1 and resist vi-
13. GM threat to the environment, STOP GM, http://www.stopgm.org.uk/whats-
wrong-with-gm/gm-threat-to-environment.html (last updated Apr. 18,
2011).
14. Id.
15. Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 20-25, In re Genetically
Modified Rice, No. 4:06-MD-1811-CDP (E.D. Mo. filed May 17, 2007).
16. See Vijay Nandula, GLYPHOSATE RESISTANCE IN CROPS AND WEEDS, 35-57
(2010) (discussing how a weed becomes glyphosate resistant); Room for
Debate, Invasion of the Superweeds, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2010 6:12 PM), http:/
/roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/invasion-of-the-super
weeds/ (discussing the issues presented by glyphosate resistant weeds); Jack
Kaskey, Monsanto says Glyphosate Resistant Kocjia in Western Canada, BLOOM-
BERG NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012 10:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-01-12/monsanto-says-glyphosate-resistant-kochia-in-western-canada.
html (noting advance of glyphosate resistant weeds to new species and sum-
marizing the possible issues for farmers); see generally International Survey
of Herbicide Resistant Weeds, http://www.weedscience.org/In.asp (sum-
mary of all known herbicide resistant weeds) (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
17. William Newman and Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope with Roundup-Resistant
Weeds, N.Y. Times (May 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/
business/energy-environment/04weed.html?pagewanted=all.
18. Id.
19. Brooke Glass-O'Shea, The History and Future of Genetically Modified Crops:
Frankenfoods, Superweeds, and the Developing World, 7 J. Food L. & Pol'y 1
(2011).
20. U.S. Dep't of Agric., Monsanto Co.; Determination of Nonregulated Status for
Soybean Genetically Engineered To Have a Modified Fatty Acid Profile and for Toler-
ance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 76 Fed. Reg. 78232 (Dec. 16, 2011); see also
CROP BIOTECH UPDATE, Nutritious GM Soybean Receives USDA Deregulation,
(Dec. 21, 2011) (" The GM soybean produces soybean oil with increased
levels of monounsaturated fat while significantly lowering saturated fat."),
available at http://www.isaaa.org/kc/cropbiotechupdate/article/default.
asp?ID=8963 (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
21. Salim Al-Babili & Peter Beyer, Golden Rice - five years on the road -five years to
go? 10 TRENDS IN PLANT SCIENCE 565, 565 (2005) ("The research that lead
to [Golden Rice] was initiated to help alleviate vitamin A deficiency ...
which represents a major global health problem.).
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ruses that threaten a plant species. 2 Despite the environmental and
economic threats posed by cross-contamination and superweeds, GE
crops have decreased herbicide and pesticide use, lowered production
cost, and increased yields.23 Finally, GE crops may have the potential
to help feed an ever-growing world population.24
Because the pros and cons of GE crops are hotly debated and not
easily proven, careful regulation is necessary. At The Framework's
foundation is the realization that the environment and people should
not be exposed to unwarranted risks nor should they be denied access
to helpful technology.2 ' However, this article argues that The Frame-
work inadequately mandates data collection and scientific analysis of
that data. More specifically, the process requires little data collection
and analysis from the time a GE crop enters the regulated environ-
ment, typically at field trials, through to its deregulation petition. As a
result, when the USDA receives a deregulation petition, there are
often unanswered environmental, economic, and public health
concerns.
This article suggests that applying principles of regulatory science2 6
to GE crop deregulation could improve deregulation decisions by
bringing independence, transparency, and public science 27 to the
22. HAwAii PAPAYA INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, http://www.hawaiipapaya.com/rain-
bow.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (discussing the GE papaya "Rainbow"
this industry group states: "The Rainbow papaya has given Hawaii's farmers
a second chance to be able to continue growing papaya. Prior to Rainbow
papaya, the papaya ringspot virus disease had become so widespread that
the Hawaii papaya industry was on the verge of existence and survival. Rain-
bow papaya offers farmers a choice for effectively producing Hawaii pre-
mium papaya in areas where the papaya ringspot virus continues to affect
papaya plants.").
23. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPACT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS ON
FARM SUSTAINABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 9-10 (2010).
24. Robin McKie, Genetically modified crops are the key to human survival, says UK's
chief scientist, THE OBSERVER (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2011/jan/23/gm-foods-world-population-crisis (noting ad-
vance of glyphosate resistant weeds to new species and summarizing the
possible issues for farmers).
25. See generally The Framework, supra note 6.
26. See Yeowoon Lebovitz, et al., INST. OF MED., Workshop Summary: Building a
National Framework for the Establishment of Regulatory Science for Drug Develop-
ment 6 (2010) (Box 2-1 summarizes several definitions though the authors
note that regulatory science has no formal definition and describe the field
generally as "drawing science and policy together for the benefit of public
health and safety."). The concept of "civic science" or "participatory sci-
ence", which seeks to democratize scientific expertise is a related concept,
but beyond the scope of this article. See Karin Bacsktrand, Civic Science for
Sustainability: Reframing the Role of Experts, Policy-Makers and Citizens in Envi-
ronmental Governance, 3 GLOBAL ENvTL. POLITICS 24 (2003); PhilipJ. Vergrat
& Halina Szejnwald Brown, GMO as a Swtainability Issue, in GOVERNING RISK
IN GM AGRICULTURE 201, 213-15 (Michael Baram & Mathilde Bourrier,
eds.) (2011)
27. See G. Steven McMillen, et al., An analysis of the critical role of public science in
innovation: the case of biotechnology, 29 RESEARCH POL. 1 (2000) (Public sci-
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process. These regulatory science attributes have the potential to in-
crease public confidence in GE crops, or at least promote greater un-
derstanding of genetic engineering, which may lead to better-
informed public debate on how (or whether) GE crops should be part
of the American and global food system. This article does not suggest
that the United States adopt the "precautionary principle,"28 which
forms the basis of European regulation of GE crops. While some be-
lieve the precautionary approach is preferable, it is not likely to be
politically viable in America, nor would it be compatible with funda-
mental legal decisions already made here.o Before delving too
deeply into the details of the issues presented by the GE deregulation
process, a brief overview of how it works is necessary.
A. Establishing Regulatory Standards: The Framework and The Policy
The panoply of law that applies to GE crops includes the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA)," the Plant Protection Act
(PPA)," the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)," and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).3"
While a few scholars have suggested that GE technology requires its
own law," the federal government never adopted this position.
Rather, the government relied on pre-existing laws and established
legal definitions to shape the use of GE technology as it developed.
ence is "knowledge that originates from universities, research institutions,
government laboratories.").
28. NEAL FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION 648 (2009) ("Many people have argued
that the law should establish a duty to prevent not only known environmen-
tal harms and health risks but also to prevent conduct that may be harmful
although conclusive scientific evidence is not available indicating actual
harm. This concept is sometimes referred to as the 'Precautionary Princi-
ple."'); BERND VAN DER MEULEN & MENNO VAN DER VELDE, EUROPEAN FOOD
LAw HANDBOOK 269-272 (2008) ("The precautionary principle deals with
decision making in the face of scientific uncertainty.").
29. See Fortin, supra note 28.
30. See generally, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010);
Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C08-00848JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 21, 2009).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
32. 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006).
33. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
35. E.g., Jillian S. Hishaw, "Show-Me" No Rice Pharming: An Overview of the Intro-
duction of and Opposition to Genetically Engineered Pharmaceutical Crops in the
United States, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 209, 226 (2007) ("With the need for
present regulations to become more restrictive and the urgency to create
additional regulations, the federal government's insufficient role in regulat-
ing genetically engineered crops is not only publicly obvious but dire.");
Sheryl Lawrence, What Would You Do with A Fluorescent Green Pig?: How Novel
Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the Foundational Assumptions for the Regula-
tion of Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 280 (2007).
36. See The Framework, supra note 6.
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In 1986, the federal government finalized The Framework." The
Framework is the first in a series of regulatory policy statements coor-
dinating the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)," the USDA,"
and the FDA.40 The Framework took two essential positions. First, it
declared, "existing statutes provide a basic network of agency jurisdic-
tion over both research and products; this network forms the basis of
this coordinated framework and helps assure reasonable safeguards for the
public."4 1 Second, with regard to FDA pre-market review, it deter-
mined that, though biotechnology was not specifically addressed by
the law, "the laws and regulations under which the agency approves
products place the burden of proof of safety as well as effectiveness of
products on the manufacturer."42 The Framework also anticipated,
" [b]y the time a genetically engineered product is ready for commer-
cialization, it will have undergone substantial review and testing dur-
ing the research phase, and thus, information regarding its safety
should be available."4" The FDA furthered its explanation of the pre-
market review process in 1992 in The Policy.4 4
The 1992 Policy remains the touchstone of FDA pre-market ap-
proval of GE crops, whether destined for animal or human consump-
tion." The essential components of The Policy explain that GE crop
classification is the same as for other substances, dependent upon "in-
tended use."4 6 For the purposes of this article, perhaps the most im-
portant aspect of The Policy is its approach to NEPA. The Policy
acknowledges the applicability of the NEPA and announces the
agency's approach to rely on the USDA and EPA's NEPA analysis to
the extent possible.47 Further, the FDA declares that its activities re-
garding foods from new plant varieties, such "as consultation with pro-
ducers on safety issues[,] . . .will constitute agency action under
NEPA."48
Though the FDA is often considered the central agency in the GE
food debate, the USDA has deregulated many GE crops49 including
37. See The Framework, supra note 6, at 1.
38. The EPA has authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §136 (2006).
39. The USDA has authority under the Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §7702
(2006).
40. The FDA has authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C.
§301 (2006).
41. The Framework, supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added).
42. The Framework, supra note 6, at 24.
43. The Framework, supra note 6, at 7.
44. The Framework, supra note 6 at 7.
45. The Policy, supra note 6, at 22986.
46. The Policy, supra note 6, at 22984.
47. The Policy, supra note 6, at 23004.
48. The Policy, supra note 6, at 23004.
49. Tim Durham & John Doucet, Risk of Regulation or Regulation of Risk? A de
minimus Framework for Genetically Modified Crops, 14 AcBio FORUM 61, 62
(2011) (noting that though 11,600 applications for field trials have been
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alfalfa,"o sugar beets, 1 and corn.5 The USDA regulates GE crops
under the PPA5 ' because the genetic engineering of the plant typi-
cally classifies the GE plants as "plant pests."" Deregulation occurs
when the owner of GE technology, such as Monsanto, petitions the
USDA to deregulate a crop.5 5 When ruling on a deregulation petition,
the USDA must comply with NEPA.5 ' The NEPA requires an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) when a federal agency's decision will
significantly affect the quality of the human environment.57 In the GE
alfalfa and sugar beet cases, the USDA issued an environment assess-
ment (EA) that concluded that deregulation would have no signifi-
cant impact on the human environment, which eliminates the need
for the EIS." These decisions formed the basis for judicial review. 59
B. Testing Regulatory Standards, Failing judicial Review
A regulatory scheme is subjected to a rigorous test when there is
judicial review of the decisions made under the scheme. In the last few
years, the GE crop deregulation scheme has twice failed the judicial
review test.co These challenges to GE crop deregulation signal that the
deregulation process is not optimal. As this article explains, judicial
review identified key failings in GE crop deregulation. In particular,
the current regulatory scheme fails to adequately consider two specific
issues: crop cross-contamination and superweeds." More broadly, the
current regulatory scheme does not adequately capture GE crops' so-
cioeconomic impact and safety data that can assure the public that
made to USDA, and 10,700 have been approved, only 89 have been granted
deregulated status).
50. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) ("Respon-
dents in this case brought suit under the APA to challenge a particular
agency order: APHIS's decision to completely deregulate RRA.") .
51. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C08-00848JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 21, 2009).
52. USDA Announces Decision to Deregulate Genetically Engineered Corn,
USDA Press Release (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/news
room.
53. 7 U.S.C. § 7701, 7711(a) (2011); 7 C.F.R. §§2.22(a), 2.80(a)(36) (2010).
54. See supra note 52.
55. 7 U.S.C. §7711(c) (2011); 7 C.F.R. 340.6 (2012).
56. 42 U.S.C. §4332(c) (requiring Federal agencies to prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement for decisions "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.").
57. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2012).
58. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2012).
59. Both cases are brought under 5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A) (arbitrary and capri-
cious review).
60. See generally, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010);
Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C08-00848JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 21, 2009).
61. See Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2743.
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under the NEPA standards there are minimal risks to the public asso-
ciated with deregulation.' 2
More specifically, the Supreme Court ruled in Monsanto Co. v. Geert-
son Seed Farms" that the USDA did not adequately consider how der-
egulation of GE alfalfa could: 1) result in gene transmission from GE
fields to organic or conventional fields; and 2) result in pesticide-resis-
tant weeds (superweeds).64 The Supreme Court found that the USDA
failure violated the NEPA" and mandated that the Agency complete
an EIS." To support its holding, the Court focused on the district
court's factual finding that the USDA's reasons for finding genetic
contamination risks were "speculative" and "not convincing."67
Similarly, in Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, the Northern California
district court found that the USDA's decision to deregulate sugar beet
was inadequate.6 1 In a contentious case, the court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction preventing farmers from planting GE sugar beet crops
pending the completion of an EIS by the USDA. 6' The court found
that the restrictive permits (designed to prevent contamination of
non-GE crops) under which farmers planted GE sugar beets were inef-
fective because there were numerous reported cases of cross-contami-
nation.o The USDA's primary failing in the case was again its
misapplication of the NEPA. Specifically, the USDA conducted an EA
and wrongfully concluded that there was no need for an EIS, and
failed to permit the plaintiffs and the public to participate in the der-
egulation process."
This recent legal action surrounding deregulation will not surprise
those who have watched GE regulation unfold over the last twenty-five
years. Since Diamond v. Chakrabarty held that GE living organisms were
patentable subject matter, concerned farmers, environmentalists, and
consumers have argued against the marketing of GE crops and
foods.7 " Historically, most legal action around GE foods and crops ad-
dressed the scope of intellectual property rights (IPR) in relation to
farmers' "rights."" However, the farmers' arguments to limit IPR
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
63. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. at 2743, 2756.
64. Id. at 2751.
65. 42 U.S.C. §4332(c) (2006).
66. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. at 2743, 2743.
67. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. at 2763.
68. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C08-00848JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 21, 2009).
69. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
70. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 753 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
71. Id.
72. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding the patent of genet-
ically engineered oil-scouring bacteria met the definition of 35 U.S.C. §101
and were eligible for a utility patent).
73. E.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001); Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (2009); see generally KEITH
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rights in favor of the agricultural traditions of seed saving and sharing
were resoundingly unsuccessful.
As the IPR challenges failed, the corporations owning GE crop tech-
nology gained more control over the U.S. seed supply.75 In 2010, con-
cern over the extent of this vertical integration and resulting
corporate control prompted the U.S. Department of Justice to con-
duct listening sessions around the nation.7 ' These sessions' purpose
was to provide a forum for farmers and others to communicate di-
rectly with the federal government about the "dynamics of competi-
tion" in agricultural markets.7 7 These listening sessions illustrate
stakeholders' continuing concerns over the impact of GE crops and
opposition to corporate control of agriculture through IPRs.
C. The Future Is Now: Why Should The Framework Change?
Why is GE crop deregulation concerning? There are two reasons.
First, the issues raised by Geertson and Center for Food Safety call into
question the efficacy of The Framework and The Policy.7 1 More suc-
cinctly, the legal arguments made by both parties at deregulation call
into question the value of The Framework and The Policy, since the
NEPA turned out to be the statute that hindered deregulated GE
crops from coming on the market (where they are undetectable to
consumers)." Second, recent focus on regulatory scienceso makes it
timely to revisit the decisions made in 1986 and 1992 concerning how
AOKI, SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2008).
74. E.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001); Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (2009); see generally KEITH
AOKI, SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2008).
75. PHILIP HOWARD, DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AGRICULTURE RECREATION AND RE-
SOURCE STUDIES, VISUALIZING CONSOLIDATION IN THE GLOBAL SEED INDUSTRY
(2009).
76. See Agriculture and Enforcement Issues in our 21st Century Economy, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/ag2010/index.
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). The anti-trust issues discussed at the listen-
ing sessions are beyond the scope of this article. Here, they are used to
illustrate the controversy surrounding GE foods has not been limited to IPR
per se, but also the effect of IPRs on agriculture.
77. Id.
78. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010); Ctr. for
Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C08-00848 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal.,
Sept. 21, 2009).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2010).
80. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Ad-
vancing Regulatory Science for Public Health: A Framework for FDA's Regulatory
Science Initiative 3 (Oct. 2010) available at www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/
SpecialTopics/RegulatoryScience/ucm228131.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2012) [hereinafter Advancing Regulatory Science] ("Regulatory science is the
science of developing new tools, standards, and approaches to assess the
safety, efficacy, quality, and performance of FDA-regulated products.").
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American law treats GE crops. Regulatory science is already being pro-
moted by the FDA as an avenue to involve "scientific tools and infor-
mation-gathering and analytical data to study data, people, health
systems, and communities."s"
Both reasons for change are significant, and taken together they
raise questions about the efficacy of the American regulatory process.
On paper, The Framework and The Policy seem reasonable. Cer-
tainly, given arguments that GE crops will feed an ever-increasing
world population while also decreasing use of pesticides and herbi-
cides, it made sense to adopt regulatory policy that would not hamper
the technology's growth and development."
But over the last twenty-five years, the public has not gained confi-
dence in GE crops." Why not? First, GE crops are likely to contami-
nate neighboring farms' crops, which are either organic84 or
conventionally farmed, decreasing the value of their crops and harm-
ing the farmland by creating problems such as superweeds." Second,
there are continuing concerns that GE crops pose unknown health
risks to human, animal, and environmental health." Third, U.S. law
does not require food labels to disclose the presence of GE foods once
they receive market approval." Theoretically, the FDA, the USDA,
and the EPA are fully reviewing GE crop safety." Yet, if this regulatory
framework is effective, then why was the NEPA able to foil the USDA's
deregulation decisions?
The remainder of this article analyzes details of GE crop regulation.
Section II examines the regulatory regime in detail and identifies its
shortcomings. Section III analyzes the recent deregulation challenges
and related cases to illustrate the shortcomings identified by judicial
review. Finally, Section IV suggests how, based on the current regula-
81. Id.
82. See NAT'L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICUL,-
TURE 7-14, 15-19 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?re-
cordid=9889 (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
83. See Mark Bittman, GMO Poll Results (and More), THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb.
24, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://bittman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/gmo-
poll-results-and-more/?ref=geneticallymodifiedfood.
84. In this article, the term "organic" refers to farms that are certified under 7
U.S.C. §§6501-6522 and 7 C.F.R. Part 205 (2012). The term "conventional"
refers to farming methods such as mono-cropping and pesticide use, but
not GE seed or products.
85. JUST LABEL IT! http://justlabelit.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (seeking to
submit at least 1 million comments in support of granting the Center for
Food Safety's petition to require labeling of GE foods).
86. See e.g. ANDREW KIMBRELL, YOUR RIGHT To KNOW: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND
THE SECRET CHANGES IN YOUR FOOD 16 (2007).
87. See e.g. Mark Bittman, Why aren't G.M.O. foods labeled?, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
15, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/why-arent-
g-m-o-foods-labeled.
88. See e.g.The Framework, supra note 6 and The Policy, supra note 6 (explain-
ing the coordinated agency approach).
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tions and case outcomes, the regulatory process could be revised to
capture better safety data, address socioeconomic concerns, and give
greater weight to consumer preferences.
II. RATIONAL REGULATION OR SLOPPY STANDARDS?
GE technology is nothing new. In fact, the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) granted its first deregulation petition
under the Plant Pest Act (PPA) to Flavr Savr tomatoes in 1992 as an
interpretive ruling.8 9 Two years later, the FDA gave market approval
to the tomato because scientific analysis showed it was equivalent to
conventional tomatoes.o However, due to high production costs and
possibly consumer costs, the Flavr Savr tomato was never commercially
successful and is no longer available." Other GE crops have fared
much better.9 2 To date, APHIS has granted eighty-nine GE crop der-
egulation petitions." These deregulated GE crops include potato,
corn, soy, squash, rice, and canola (rapeseed).94 Farmers have widely
adopted many of these crops and, in particular, commodity crops
such as soy and corn."
89. USDA, APHIS, Interpretive Ruling on Calgene, Inc., Petition for Determination of
Regulatory Status oJFLAVR SAVRTM Tomato, 57 Fed. Reg. 47608-01 (Oct. 19,
1992) ("The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is an-
nouncing the issuance of an interpretive ruling that the Calgene, Inc.
FLAVRSAVRm tomato does not present a plant pest risk and is not a regu-
lated article under the regulations contained in 7 CFR part 340. This action
is in response to a petition submitted by Calgene, Inc., seeking a determina-
tion from APHIS that its FLAVR SAVRm tomato no longer be deemed a
regulated article based on an absence of plant pest risk.").
90. Agency Summary Memorandum Re: Consultation with Calgene, Inc., Concerning
FLAVRSAVRm Tomatoes U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (May 17, 1994), http:/
/www.fda.gov/Food/Biotechnology/Submissions/ucm225043.htm.
91. G. Bruening &J.M. Lyons, The Case of the Flavr Savr Tomato, 54 CAL. AGRI. 6,
7 (2000) (explaining that though more than 1.8 million cans of clearly la-
beled as GE product were sold, sales dropped precipitously after an English
scientist claimed rats fed GE foods experienced biological changes that
might be attributed to the GE foods. The claim was later shown false, but
Flavr Savr was never commercially viable again.).
92. Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S., USDA (July 1,
2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/.
93. Durham & Doucet, supra note 49, at 62; see also USDA APHIS, Table of Non-
regulated Status, (May 16, 2012), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnol-
ogy/not-reg.html and search function for applications available at http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/status.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2012);
Virginia Tech, Information Systems for Biotechnology, http://www.isb.vt.edu/
data.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (a searchable data base and informa-
tion clearinghouse for USDA-APHIS GE crop deregulation actions).
94. Virginia Tech, Information Systems for Biotechnology, http://www.isb.vt.edu/
search-petition-data.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
95. Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S., USDA (July 1,
2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/.
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Since 1992, APHIS has received at least 133 deregulation peti-
tions." Of these, twenty-nine have had no environmental assessment
(EA)." For those petitions without an environmental assessment, only
one has gained approval, and twenty-six petitions were withdrawn.98
APHIS has conducted an EA on eighty-three products, with seventy-
eight approvals and five pending review."9 From these numbers, it ap-
pears APHIS has carefully complied with the NEPA.' 00 However, a le-
gitimate question is whether the EA is adequate for the eighty-three
deregulated crops or whether there should have been an EIS, such as
the courts mandated for alfalfa and sugar beets. While an answer to
this question is impossible, it provokes thought on whether the pro-
cess rigorously considers the issues raised in recent cases as discussed
below.
A. Planting GE Crops
The Framework's fundamental purpose is to coordinate federal
agencies with overlapping regulatory control of GE crops.1 o' The
Framework primarily coordinates the EPA, USDA, and FDA's role in
approving GE crops for market.'0 2 In 1984, a working group began
developing The Framework with the goal of balancing regulation pro-
tecting health and environmental safety while "maintaining sufficient
regulatory flexibility to avoid impeding the growth of an infant indus-
try."' Based on innovation in other fields, The Framework antici-
pated that "as the science progressed and became better understood
by the public, regulatory regimens could be modified to reflect more
complete understanding of the potential risks involved."o' Twenty-
five years later, this statement raises two questions. First, has the sci-
ence evolved to help us understand the risks of GE crops? Second, is
the science better understood by the public? Unfortunately, based on
the recent petition drive to label GE foods and the cases discussed
below,1 05 the answer appears to be "no."
96. Virginia Tech, Information Systems for Biotechnology, http://www.isb.vt.
edu/search-petition-data.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
97. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23302 23302 (1986).
98. Id. at 23303.
99. Id. at 23302-03.
100. Id. at 23303.
101. See infra pp. 24-44 and accompanying notes.
102. The Framework also includes NIH, NSF, and OSHA. This article's focus is
on EPA, USDA, and FDA because these agencies regulate a GE crop's
commercialization.
103. The Framework, supra note 6, at 4.
104. The Framework, supra note 6, at 5.
105. See infra Section III and accompanying notes.
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B. The FDA and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), the FDA's re-
sponsibility is to ensure that foods, whether for animal or human con-
sumption, are not adulterated or misbranded.o0 GE foods are no
different than conventional foods in that any substance that could
harm health or environmental safety or that could adulterate the food
would be illegal to market. 10 7 If a substance meets the definition of
food additive, the marketer must seek food additive approval under
section 409.os Generally, food additives must be shown to be safe,
which means "a demonstration to a reasonable certainty that the addi-
tive will not adversely affect the health of consumers."os Foods that
contain unapproved additives are considered "adulterated" and sub-
ject to enforcement action under the law.' 10 Therefore, under the
1986 policy, GE foods are reviewed as any other food additive."'
As the FDA developed The Policy for new plant varieties, it focused
on analysis of the "host" plant and "donor" material.112 The Policy's
goal is to determine a new plant variety's safety and nutrition as soon
as the plant could enter the food supply, which is typically at the time
106. FORTIN, supra note 28, at 149-51 (explaining adulteration and
misbranding).
107. See Peggy G. Lemaux, Genetically Engineered Plants and Foods: A Scientist's
Analysis of the Issues (Part I), 59 Annu. Rev. Plant Biol. 771, 775 (2008).
108. The Framework, supra note 6, at 24 (also noting FDCA section 706 required
pre-clearance of color additives); see also FORTIN, supra note 28, at 264-65
(explaining the food additive approval process).
109. The Framework, supra note 6, at 31. See also 21 U.S.C. 321 (s) (2006) ("The
term 'food additive' means any substance the intended use of which results
or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becom-
ing a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (in-
cluding any substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing,
packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or hold-
ing food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such use),
if such substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been ade-
quately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures
or experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the condi-
tions of its intended use; except that such term does not include-(1) a
pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw agricultural commodity or
processed food; or (2) a pesticide chemical; or (3) a color additive; or (4)
any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval granted prior
to the enactment of this paragraph pursuant to this Act [enacted Sept. 6,
1958], the Poultry Products Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 451 and the follow-
ing) or the Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. 1260), as
amended and extended (21 U.S.C. 71 and the following); (5) a new animal
drug; or (6) an ingredient described in paragraph (ff) in, or intended for
use in, a dietary supplement.")
110. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-417, § 2, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
111. See The Framework, supra note 6, at 1.
112. The Policy, supra note 6, at 22994, 22998.
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it is planted."'s The Policy's focus is on identifying unintended and
undesirable consequences of GE, such as allergenicity or toxicity.114
"Host" plant (the plant pre-modification) data is requested to help
identify any particular toxicity potential." Relevant donor informa-
tion includes history of use in food, toxicity, anti-nutrient, and aller-
gen potential." Other relevant data reported includes analysis of
proteins, carbohydrates, fats and oils, nucleic acids, metabolic consid-
erations, and stability of the plant."'
Since adopting The Framework and The Policy, the FDA has con-
tinued to hone its guidance. 1 The U.S. Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy (OSTP) also issued a notice requesting voluntary
monitoring of new proteins produced by GE plants."' Today, FDA
review is also closely tied to USDA analysis.1 2 0
C. USDA and the Plant Protection Act
The Plant Protection Act (PPA) grants the USDA the authority to
regulate GE crops."' The PPA's basic rule for GE crops is that they
fall within the definition of "plant pests"122 and are therefore "regu-
lated articles"12 3 subject to notice or permit requirements before they
113. The Policy, supra note 6, at 22994, 22998.
114. See The Policy, supra note 6, 22986-22988.
115. See The Policy, supra note 6, 22991.
116. See The Policy, supra note 6, at 22996-22997.
117. See The Policy, supra note 6, at 22998-23004.
118. See Proposed Federal Actions To Update Field Test Requirements for Bi-
otchnology Derived Plants and To Establish Early Food Safety Assessments
for New Proteins Produced by Such Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. 50578 (Aug. 2,
2002).
119. Id.
120. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
EARLY FOOD SAFETY EVALUATION OF NEW NON-PESTICIDAL PROTEINS PRO-
DUCED BY NEW PLANT VARIETIES INTENDED FOR FOOD USE (June 2006), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/GuidanceDocuments/Biotechnology/ucm096156.htm.
121. See Plant Protection Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. §7701 (2006).
122. Id. at §7702(14) ("The term 'plant pest' means any living stage of any of
the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or
cause disease in any plant or plant product:
(A) A protozoan.
(B) A nonhuman animal.
(C) A parasitic plant.
(D) A bacterium.
(E) A fungus.
(F) A virus or viroid.
(G) An infectious agent or other pathogen.
(H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the articles specified in
the preceding subparagraphs.").
123. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2011) ("Regulated article. Any organism which has been
altered or produced through genetic engineering, if the donor organism,
recipient organism, or vector or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa
designated in § 340.2 and meets the definition of plant pest, or is an unclas-
sified organism and/or an organism whose classification is unknown, or
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can enter American agriculture. 1 24 One of the PPA's purposes is to
ensure no GE crops are introduced to American agriculture without
the APHIS's knowledge and safety evaluation. 12' The APHIS evaluates
GE crops through the notification procedure or permit application
process and then sets requirements for the planting, harvesting, and
transportation of crops.1 26 Like the FDA, the APHIS relies on scien-
tific data generated by the applicant to show that a GE crop is safe.127
The notification procedure is the core regulation for most GE crops
destined for animal or human consumption.'12 This rule requires no-
tice to the APHIS at least thirty days before an "environmental re-
lease,"12 e which typically means that the GE crop will be planted in
open fields.' While less onerous than the permit application pro-
cess, the notification procedure has six significant criteria. First, the
crop cannot be listed as a "noxious weed."'' This concept is impor-
tant because it can be used to foil a deregulation petition.112 However,
any product which contains such an organism, or any other organism or
product altered or produced through genetic engineering which the Ad-
ministrator, determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe is a plant
pest. Excluded are recipient microorganisms which are not plant pests and
which have resulted from the addition of genetic material from a donor
organism where the material is well characterized and contains only non-
coding regulatory regions.").
124. Id. at §340.3.
125. Id.
126. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3-,4 (2012).
127. Id.
128. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(b) (4) (2012); see also USDA-APHIS, Policy on Responding to
the Low-Level Presence of Regulated Genetically Engineered Plant Materials, 2
(Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/guidance/index.
shtml ("Permits are generally more restrictive than notifications and are
used for any type of GE plant that may pose an elevated risk to plant health
or the environment for which APHIS has less regulatory experience and
familiarity, such as plants engineered to produce pharmaceutical or indus-
trial compounds.").
129. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2012) ("Release into the environment. The use of a regu-
lated article outside the constraints of physical confinement that are found
in a laboratory, contained greenhouse, or a fermenter or other contained
structure.").
130. USDA-APHIS, Policy on Responding to the Low-Level Presence of Regulated Geneti-
cally Engineered Plant Materials, 2 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/guidance/index.shtml.
131. 7 U.S.C. §7702(10) (2012) ("The term 'noxious weed' means any plant or
plant product that can directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to
crops (including nursery stock or plant products), livestock, poultry, or
other interests of agriculture, irrigation, navigation, the natural resources
of the United States, the public health, or the environment.").
132. Some GE crop opponents have attempted to remove GE crops from notifi-
cation process eligibility by petitioning to have them listed as noxious
weeds. Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14
(D.D.C. 2007) (remanding APHIS noxious weed petition denial after find-
ing its decision arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that "after Scotts'
first [deregulation] petition, plaintiffs . . . filed their own petition request-
ing that APHIS place GTCB and GE glyphosate tolerant Kentucky bluegrass
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at the notice stage it would be unlikely that a GE crop was listed as a
noxious weed.13 3
Next, the regulation focuses on the stability of the plant. 134 These
requirements include that the GE material be "stably integrated" into
the host and that the material is not known to cause plant disease.13 1
Similarly, the GE material cannot be known to produce an "infectious
entity" or toxicity to non-target plants.' 3 The remainder of the regu-
lation focuses on similar concerns about infection and toxicity in the
environment, including to humans and animals.1 3' Finally, the rule
specifically precludes GE plants that are for industrial or pharmaceuti-
cal uses from the notification procedure. 13 Such plants are required
to follow the permit application process, which requires more infor-
mation and monitoring than the notice process.139
The permit application process, which is not generally required for
GE crops intended to enter the food chain, is helpful to compare to
the notification process because it illustrates the differing levels of
scrutiny the APHIS employs.14 0 The basic difference between permit
application and notice is in the level of detail required to describe the
GE plant; the permit is designed to capture information about novel
varieties. 14 1 For example, it requires detailed description of the differ-
ences between the GE plant and its conventional counterpart, the mo-
lecular biology of the GE plant (including donor recipient-vector)
from where all parts of the GE plant originated, and the purpose of
the GE plant.'4 2
The permit application process also requires detailed information
about the planned environmental release. 14' The quantity and sched-
ule of releases must be specified along with the "processes, proce-
dures, and safeguards which have been used or will be used" in the
origin country and the U.S. to "prevent contamination, release, and
on the Federal Noxious Weed List ... [h]ad the petition been granted, it
would have enabled defendants to prohibit or restrict movement of these
plants to prevent their introduction into the United States and their use in
interstate commerce. APHIS, however, denied the petition.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
133. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3(B) (1) (2012).
134. 7 C.F.R. §340.3(2)-(4).
135. Id.
136. Id. at §340.3(b) (4).
137. Id. at § 340.3(b) (5)-(6).
138. Id. at §340.4(iii).
139. The permit application process is not fully analyzed here because it is un-
likely that it would be used for animal or human food purposes.
140. 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.3-4.
141. BRS Factsheet, APHIS Biotechnology: Permitting Progress Into Tomorrow, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/gui-
dance/index.shtml.
142. 7 C.F.R. §340.4(b) (5)-(8) (2012).
143. Id. at § 340.4(b).
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dissemination" of the GE plant.'" The U.S. destination, which is sub-
ject to APHIS inspection, must also be disclosed.14 5 Finally, the appli-
cation must specify the method of disposal after field trial."'
On paper, the PPA and its accompanying regulation represent a
rational method to allow GE crops to be developed and offered on the
market. Yet as recent cases have shown, in practice the scheme may be
lacking.'4 7 The key issue is whether the APHIS is adequately reviewing
the science presented by developers and whether it is adequately com-
plying with the NEPA. Recent developments, discussed below, indicate
the answer is "no" on both counts.14 ' An ancillary, but critical issue, is
whether this system is adequately transparent. For example, most
Americans are probably unaware that regulators might tolerate "low
levels" of GE material in commercial crops without notice to the pub-
lic or administrative action. 14 9
D. The National Environmental Policy Act
Last, but certainly not least, is the NEPA. This statute, which plays a
minor role in The Framework, has proven to be the most powerful
statute in GE crop deregulation challenges.' The NEPA's require-
ment to perform an environmental impact statement (EIS) was the
one regulatory hurdle that plaintiffs successfully used to force the
USDA to consider the implications of GE crop deregulation more
broadly."' Though Congress' purpose for the NEPA may be quite fa-
miliar, it bears repeating here:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment;
to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
144. Id. at §340.4(b) (10).
145. Id. at § 340.4(b) (10).
146. Id. at §340.4(b)(14).
147. See generally Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743; Ctr. for Food Safety v.
Vilsack, C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009).
148. See infra Section II. RATIONAL REGULATION OR SLOPPY STANDARDS? - D. The
National Environmental Policy Act.
149. See Policy on Responding to the Low-Level Presence of Regulated Genetically Engi-
neered Plant Materials, supra note 128, at 3 ("If APHIS determines that action
is not necessary to mitigate low-level presence of a regulated material in
commerce to protect plant health or the environment, this determination
does not preclude enforcement action against a company or individual for
violation of APHIS regulations. APHIS will investigate and take appropri-
ate enforcement action whenever regulated materials are detected in com-
merce."). See generally In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, infra text at
pp. 39-42.
150. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2012); 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.7 (2012).
151. See The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (Pub. L.
No. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, Jan. 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. No.
94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, Aug. 9, 1975, and Pub. L. No. 97-258,§ 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982).
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the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the eco-
logical systems and natural resources important to the Na-
tion; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality
[CEQ] .1
The NEPA fulfills this purpose by mandating that government coor-
dinate its activities to achieve six specific goals. Those goals are to:
1. fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
the environment for succeeding generations; 2. assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings; 3. attain the widest range of
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk
to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences; 4. preserve important historic, cultural, and
natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wher-
ever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and
variety of individual choice; 5. achieve a balance between
population and resource use which will permit high stan-
dards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 6.
enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach
the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources.1 5 3
The NEPA achieves these goals by requiring agencies to issue an EIS
when "major Federal actions significantly [affect] the quality of the
human environment."1 5 4
A prominent feature of CEQ regulations1 5 is that agencies should
apply the NEPA early in the planning process to ensure that agency
decisions "reflect environmental values," to avoid delay, and prevent
conflict.1 5' Further, one of its most beneficial features is that it re-
quires integration of natural and social sciences, as "environmental
design arts" to analyze the full impact of a proposed federal action. 15 7
This multifaceted analysis is one that is well-suited to agricultural
crops, which tend to have farm-to-fork constituents and sometimes
drastically different views of the right course.
Though CEQ regulations specify what agency the NEPA rules must
address, it is the agency rules themselves that set out how the NEPA is
implemented.1 5 s In the case of GE crops, the devil is in this detail. An
EIS is not required when an agency has specified a "categorical exclu-
152. Id.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
155. Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. Parts 1500 - 1508 (2012).
156. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2, 1501.02 (2012).
157. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.2(a) (2012).
158. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2012) (specifying how an agency should determine
whether an EIS is required).
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sion" for its action.'5 A categorical exclusion is one that does not by
itself or cumulatively have "a significant impact on the human envi-
ronment."16 0 A cumulative impact is one that "results from the incre-
mental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (fed-
eral or non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions. "161
Therefore, to understand how the federal government applies the
NEPA, it is necessary to look at each agency's NEPA implementation
regulations.
The USDA has generally concluded that GE crop registration under
the PPA is subject to a categorical exclusion.' However, the exclu-
sion does not apply "when a confined field release of genetically engi-
neered organisms or products involves new species or organisms or
novel modifications that raise new issues." 6 s Additionally, the USDA's
NEPA rules also specify that GE crop-permitting actions generally re-
quire an EA, but not an EIS. 1 6 4
While these rules make sense in theory, it is worthwhile to consider
whether what the NEPA provides in spirit, agency implementation
regulations remove in practice. In the cases discussed below, the
USDA sought the refuge of the EA alone even though release of a GE
crop, which as the potential for cross-contamination to many, is easily
categorized as a "significant impact on the human environment."1 6 5
In light of the tension between the NEPA's aspirations and the
USDA's implementation, the question becomes whether there is a bet-
ter way to evaluate GE crop impact from the time it becomes a regu-
lated article to the point of deregulation. Without such reform, the
regulations clearly place the burden on plaintiffs to overcome categor-
159. 40 C.F.R. §1501.4(a) (2) (2012).
160. 40 C.F.R. §1508.4 (2012) ("'Categorical Exclusion' means a category of
actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect
on the human environment and which have been found to have no such
effect in procedures adopted by a federal agency in implementation of
these regulations (§1507.3) and for which, therefore, neither an environ-
mental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required. An
agency may decide in its procedures or otherwise, to prepare environmen-
tal assessments for the reasons stated in §1508.9 even though it is not re-
quired to do so. Any procedures under this section shall provide for
extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have
a significant environmental effect.").
161. 40 C.F.R. §1508.07 (2012).
162. 7 C.F.R. § 372.5(c) (ii) (3) (2012) ("Permitting, or acknowledgment of noti-
fications for, confined field releases of genetically engineered organisms
and products").
163. Id. at §372.5 (d)(4).
164. Id. at §372.5(b) (4) ("Approvals and issuance of permits for proposals in-
volving genetically engineered or nonindigenous species, except for actions
that are categorically excluded, as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section.").
165. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,636 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2011); see Mon-
santo Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
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ical exclusion or the presumption that only an environmental assess-
ment is required, despite the fact that the NEPA has been enforced in
two major GE crop deregulation cases.16 6
Finally, though the NEPA has been successful in the GE crop cases,
that does not mean it is a panacea. For example, Karkkainen' 6 ' ar-
gued in 2002 that because the NEPA "does not require follow-up mon-
itoring, actual impacts remain undisclosed and there is no assurance
that mitigated impacts remain below EIS-triggering thresholds."'1 6
Similarly, Czarnezki'" points out that "[h]ypothetically, an agency
could 'steamroll' toward its preferred decision, hurdling NEPA's pro-
cedural obstacles without genuinely considering potential environ-
mental harms or the means to avoid them."7 o These well-founded
observations illustrate that the NEPA will not force more comprehen-
sive EISs and this is precisely the reason The Framework needs
revision.' 7 '
III. CONTROVERSIAL CROPS: IS DEREGULATION DOOM FOR
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE?
Analyzing The Framework in its own right is an important exercise
and one that several scholars have done well. 172 Here, the focus is on
the administrative agencies' application of The Framework and result-
ing court challenges reveal The Framework's weaknesses in action.
Four cases provide different perspectives on The Framework's flaws.
First, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farmss73 challenges the adequacy of
the APHIS' environmental review under the NEPA before GE alfalfa
crop deregulation. This case reveals the failure of The Framework and
the PPA to anticipate the NEPA's compliance while a crop is a regu-
lated article and thus set permit requirements accordingly. 174 Second,
Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack,17 1 challenges the APHIS' environmental
166. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2012).
167. 7 C.F.R. §372.5(b) (2012).
168. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter AEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 903 (2002).
169. Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship between the U.S. Supreme
Court, Administrative Procedure and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2006).
170. Id. at 4-5. But see William H. Rodgers Jr., AEPA's Insatiable Optimism, 39
ENvTL. L. RiP. NEWS & ANALYsis 10618, 10620 (2009) ("NEPA is a friend of
good science and an enemy of bad science. It's a paragon of peer review.
And it's a steady danger to justification of science that strays toward the
ideological, the political, and the convenient.").
171. See discussion infra at pp. 45-56.
172. See e.g,. Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach To Regu-
lating Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 393, 394
(2007); Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and
Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2002).
173. 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
174. Id. at 2746.
175. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,636 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
Superweeds and Suspect Seeds
review and the decision itself exposes a key issue: once the deregula-
tion occurs, there is no turning back, and there is no requirement of
cross-contamination data collection or continued safety review.1 76
Together, these two NEPA cases highlight that The Framework is
too narrowly constructed. The NEPA requires broader socioeconomic
issues of GE crop deregulation where those issues are related to envi-
ronmental impact,' 7 7 and the cases reveal The Framework is too nar-
rowly constructed at the early stages of crop development, field trial,
and approval because it does not capture information relevant to over-
all impact of the crops.1's This narrow construction and the factual
issues developed in NEPA cases leads, in turn, to the need for civil
litigation to remedy the losses created by regulatory shortsightedness,
which is a highly undesirable outcome.
The third case, In re Genetically Modifled Rice,'7 1 illustrates just how
damaging GE crops can be to organic and conventional crops. In a
memorandum decision in the case, the court rejects the USDA's toler-
ance of de minimus cross-contamination as contrary to the PPA.'so If
the PPA is the linchpin in The Framework for protecting farmers and
consumers from consuming GE crops before deregulation, then the
case highlights that such protection has failed miserably."' Finally, a
case filed in March 2011, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association v.
Monsanto,1 12 illustrates how the Framework's limited consideration of
issues affecting organic growers is pushing traditional farmers into liti-
gating their opposition to GE crops (again).
176. See id. at 1168, 1170, 1174.
177. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (2012) does not require socio-economic impact analysis
in all cases, but states:
"Human environment shall be interpreted comprehensively to include the
natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that
environment. (See the definition of "effects" (§ 1508.8).) This means that
economic or social effects are not intended by themselves to require prepa-
ration of an environmental impact statement. When an environmental im-
pact statement is prepared and economic or social and natural or physical
environmental effects are interrelated, then the environmental impact
statement will discuss all of these effects on the human environment. Early
in the Geerston case, the courts found that the issues were interrelated. See
Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) ("Here, the economic effects on the organic and con-
ventional farmers of the government's deregulation decision are interre-
lated with, and, indeed, a direct result of, the effect on the physical
environment; namely, the alteration of a plant specie's DNA through the
transmission of the genetically engineered gene to organic and conven-
tional alfalfa.").
178. See Ctr. for Food Safety, 636 F.3d at 1174; see Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2772 (2010).
179. In re Genetically Modified Rice, 666 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
180. See id. at 1019.
181. In re Genetically Modifed Rice, 666 F. Supp.2d at 1014.
182. Organic Seed Growers v. Monsanto Co., No. 11 Civ. 2163 (NRB), 2012 WL
607560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.).
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A. Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms- Novel Safety Issues
History will likely categorize Geertson Seed Farms as an administrative
law case regarding the scope of the federal courts' authority to enjoin
regulatory action pending the preparation of an EIS.' However, the
case also provides interesting insight into how the courts view GE tech-
nology. Thus, the case will not directly change the direction of Ameri-
can GE crop policy, but a careful reading of it illustrates regulatory
weaknesses and certain truths about agriculture.1 8 1 Specifically, the
Court's standing and the NEPA analysis reveal that The Framework is
wholly inadequate in addressing GE and conventional crop coexis-
tence requirements, which even if not necessary for scientific or safety
reasons, are essential for economic reasons.'
In 2004, Monsanto petitioned the APHIS to deregulate its glypho-
sate tolerant (Roundup Ready) alfalfa under the PPA.'8 Prior to that,
the GE alfalfa was a regulated article under the PPA.a' The APHIS
followed the NEPA requirements by preparing an environmental as-
sessment (EA) and publishing it for comment in the Federal Regis-
ter.188 The APHIS ultimately issued a Finding -of No Significant
Impact (FONSI) and deregulated the alfalfa.'"
Not until eight months later did Geerston Seed Farms and others
challenge the APHIS' action in federal district court.' As a result,
183. 130 S. Ct. at 2758, 2762 ("In sum, the District Court abused its discretion in
enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation and in prohibiting
the possibility of planting in accordance with the terms of such a
deregulation.").
184. See id. at 2760.
185. See generally Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
186. Id. at 2749-50.
187. Id.; see also APHIS, USDA, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events: J101 and J163;
Request for Non-Regulated Status, Final Environmental Impact Statement (Dec.
2010) [hereinafter GE Alfalfa EIS].
188. APHIS, USDA, Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability of
Petition and Environmental Assessment for Determination of Nonregulated Status
for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 69 FR
68,300-01 (Nov. 24. 2004) (announcing that the Monsanto/FGI petition
and an environmental assessment were available for public review and solic-
iting comments for 60 days endingJanuary 24, 2005); APHIS, USDA, Mon-
santo Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability Determination of
Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide
Glyphosate, 70 FR 36,917, 36,919 (June 27, 2005); see also Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S. Ct. at 2750, 2762 (briefly mentioning the numerous comments, while
Justice Stevens dissent specifically enumerates that of the 663 comments,
520 opposed deregulation).
189. APHIS, USDA, Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability De-
termination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance
to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 FR 36,917, 36,919 (June 27, 2005) ("APHIS has
carefully considered these comments and suggestions, and a response to
the issues raised in the comments is included as an attachment to the find-
ing of no significant impact.").
190. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2750-51. "The Court will enter a final judg-
ment (1) vacating the June 2005 deregulation decision; (2) ordering the
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"more than 3,000 farmers in 40 states planted an estimated 220,000
acres" of GE alfalfa.191 When the challenge came, the district court
found that the APHIS had violated the NEPA and was required to
complete an EIS before deregulating alfalfa, and then it allowed Mon-
santo to intervene in the remedial portion of the case. 1 2 The district
court enjoined the APHIS from considering a partial deregulation pe-
tition for GE alfalfa and banned planting of the crop before the
APHIS completed the ordered EIS."' Monsanto appealed."
As is typical with environmental and administrative cases, both par-
ties raised standing issues.19 5 Respondents, the conventional alfalfa
growers and environmental groups, argued that Monsanto lacked
standing because it failed to properly challenge the district court's va-
catur of the APHIS decision to deregulate."' However, in the Court's
view, because Monsanto owned the GE alfalfa intellectual property
rights, the district court's decision to enjoin consideration of its par-
tial deregulation petition and prevent planting easily met the Article
III standing requirements.1 9 7
Monsanto, the petitioner, argued that the organic and conventional
farmers lacked standing because they failed to establish imminent in-
jury, absent the injunction.19 8 However, the Supreme Court rejected
this argument based on the district court's factual finding that "those
farmers had 'established a "reasonable probability" that their organic
and conventional crops will be infected with the engineered gene' if
[GE alfalfa] is completely deregulated."' The Court identified that
conventional and organic farmers were injured by the costs of testing
to assure that their crops were free of GE alfalfa.200 Such testing was
government to prepare an EIS before it makes a decision on Monsanto's
deregulation petition; (3) enjoining the planting of any Roundup Ready
alfalfa in the United States after March 30, 2007 pending the government's
completion of the EIS and decision on the deregulation petition; and (4)
imposing the above conditions on the handling and identification of al-
ready-planted Roundup Ready alfalfa." Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns,
2007 WL 1302981 (N.D. Cal. 2007) affd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v.
Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008) opinion amended and superseded on
denial of reh'g, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (U.S. 2010) and affd
sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009)
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.
Ct. 2743 (2010).
191. Geertson Seed Farms,130 S. Ct. at 2751.
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also supra note 93.
194. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 1133 (2010).
195. Geerston Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2752, 2754.
196. Id. at 2752.
197. Id. at 2754-55.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2754.
200. Id.
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necessary to assure purity and attain the price premium for organic
and conventional non-GE alfalfa.2 0 '
In finding that organic and conventional farmers had standing, the
Court implicitly recognizes two principles that The Framework over-
looks. First, the organic and conventional farmers are injured by gene
flow from GE to non-GE crops.20 2 Second, this injury begs the ques-
tion of what remedy exists for these farmers upon deregulation of any
GE crop. 20 ' These issues are significant because they illustrate that the
ultimate consequence of deregulation may be the complete loss of
organic and conventional crops. However, as Geerston Seed Farms illus-
trates, this issue is a difficult one to address without an amended
Framework and related statutes and regulations, such as the PPA.
A closer examination of Geertson Seed Farms' specific factual findings
illustrates why amendments to The Framework, and its related poli-
cies, are necessary. At the outset, it is important to note that the NEPA
is not necessarily triggered by a new PPA regulated article notice.2 0 4
Therefore, there is not necessarily a comprehensive view of the poten-
tial effects of a GE crop on all types of farmers when the crop is first
introduced to the environment. The importance of this point is illus-
trated by the fact that though the APHIS has been making deregula-
tion decisions since 1992,205 the district courts framed the Geertson Seed
Farm in this way:
The motions raise a close question of first impression:
whether the introduction of a genetically engineered crop
that might significantly decrease the availability or even elim-
inate all non-genetically engineered varieties is a "significant
environmental impact" requiring the preparation of an envi-
ronmental impact statement, at least when it involves the
fourth largest crop in the United States.20
That the 2007 case raised "a close question of first impression"2 0 7
poses deeper questions about The Framework and the APHIS regula-
tions and, in particular, cross-contamination and superweed concerns.
For example, if the possibility that the GE crop could decrease or elim-
inate non-GE varieties, should the Framework and its related policies
201. Geerston Seed Farns, 130 S. Ct. at 2755.
202. See id. at 2754.
203. See generally PaulJ. Heald &James Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in
A Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 87, 91 (2006) ("We conclude
that the liability of pollen polluters should be governed by balancing rules
under nuisance law, to be applied on a case-by-case basis, rather than by a
blanket liability or immunity rule.").
204. See supra pp 17-18, 22-23 (discussing categorical NEPA exclusion under PPA
for noticed GE crops).
205. See Virginia Tech, Info. Systems for Biotechnology, available at http://www.
isb.vt.edu/search-petition-data.aspx (listing deregulation actions).
206. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
207. Id.
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not consider this possibility well before deregulation? Furthermore, is
the APHIS misguided in its reliance on the National Organic Program
as a mechanism to require buffer zones after deregulation?208 Finally,
do current policies give appropriate weight to superweed concerns?
All of these questions may be answered by this troubling position: the
APHIS was dismissive of superweeds as a "significant environmental
impact" in this litigation. 20' This position raises the concern that, as a
matter of policy, the APHIS has viewed all deregulation petitions with
similar nonchalance for non-GE crop elimination as a significant envi-
ronmental impact.21
In the alfalfa case, the lower court specifically found that the
APHIS' position on non-GE crop contamination and elimination as:
even if deregulation of Roundup Ready alfalfa could result
in the elimination of all non-genetically engineered alfalfa-in
other words, there would be no alfalfa grown in the United
States that does not contain the engineered gene that con-
fers tolerance to glyphosate-such a result would still not con-
stitute a significant environmental impact because APHIS
has determined that the introduction of that gene to alfalfa
is harmless to humans and livestock, that is, it is not toxic or
pathogenic.2 "
The Court rejected this reasoning and concluded that the contamina-
tion of conventional and organic alfalfa with the Roundup Ready
gene is itself an impact that is harmful to the human environment.212
Therefore, the crux of the issue with the alfalfa deregulation decision
is that the APHIS never believed that if all non-GE alfalfa were elimi-
nated because of cross-pollination that this alone would be a "signifi-
cant environmental impact. "21' The secondary, but equally important
position, taken by the APHIS was that the GE crop is not harmful to
208. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct.
2743, 2747 (2010) ("With regard to the threat of possible genetic contami-
nation of non-genetically engineered alfalfa, it explained that the National
Organic Program mandates buffer zones around organic production opera-
tions, the size of which are decided by the organic producer and the certify-
ing agent on a case-by-case basis.").
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Geertson Farms Inc. v.Johanns, 65 ERC 1467, *1 (U.S.D.C. Cali 2007).
212. Geertson Farms Inc. v.Johanns, 2007 WL 1302981 (N.D. Cal. 2007) aff'd sub
nom. Geertson Seed Farms v.Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008) opinion
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009)
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.
Ct. 2743 (2010) and affd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010)
213. Geertson Farms Inc. v.Johanns, 65 ERC 1467, *1 (U.S.D.C. Cali 2007).
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humans or animals.214 This line of analysis is troubling because if the
APHIS is correct, those who oppose GE crops are making decisions
based on non-scientific beliefs rather than scientific evidence of risk
or harm. However, if GE crop detractors are right, then the APHIS
has been slowly destroying American agriculture. How do we know
which one is right? The traditional administrative law answer is that
the expert agency should decide. But as the district court decisions
illustrate, the APHIS was wrong to issue only an environmental assess-
ment. Readers might find it more troubling that the EIS concluded
these issues were not significant and that today alfalfa is a fully deregu-
lated crop.' 5
By the time that the alfalfa case arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court,
it had become largely a procedural case questioning the authority of
the lower court to enjoin the APHIS from partially deregulating alfalfa
while it prepared a full-deregulation EIS.2 16 Though much of the deci-
sion focuses on this issue, several other aspects of the case illustrate
larger GE crop deregulation issues.
First, the Court recognized that the deregulation decision caused
injury-in-fact to organic and conventional growers because they would
have to test their crops for GE alfalfa presence and suffer potential
losses of non-GE seed sources. 2 " The Court did not require actual
cross-contamination to find injury; it was adequate that farmers would
214. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Fi-
nally, the government argues that even if the deregulation of Roundup
Ready alfalfa could result in the elimination of all non-genetically engi-
neered alfalfa-in other words, there would be no alfalfa grown in the
United States that does not contain the engineered gene that confers toler-
ance to glyphosate-such a result would still not constitute a significant envi-
ronmental impact because APHIS has determined that the introduction of that
gene to alfalfa is harmless to humans and livestock, that is, it is not toxic or patho-
genic. Draft Transcript of January 19, 2007 Hearing at 54-55. APHIS's posi-
tion is based on its finding that the engineered gene is similar to another
gene already present in non-engineered alfalfa and is the equivalent to a
natural enzyme found in both green plants and microorganisms that are
common in nature. AR 5482, 5483, 5490-91, 5501-5502, 5491. In sum,
APHIS concluded that the engineered enzyme is equivalent in all biological
respects to those that are common and harmless in nature and therefore
the introduction of that engineered gene into conventional or organic al-
falfa is not a significant environmental impact as a matter of
law.") (emphasis added).
215. APHIS, USDA, Determination of Regulated Status of Alfalfa Genetically Engi-
neered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate; Record of Decision, 76 Fed. Reg.
5780, 5780-81(Feb. 2, 2011).
216. Geertson Farms Inc. v.Johanns, 2007 WL 1302981 (N.D. Cal. 2007) affd sub
nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008) opinion
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 570 F. 3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd
and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct.
2743 (2010) and affd sub nom. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d
1130 (9th Cir. 2009) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
217. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2755.
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have to test crops to ensure that they were GE-free. 218 By recognizing
the farmers' standing, the Court implicitly recognized what The
Framework fails to: deregulation is more than the sum of regulatory
factors concerning the GE crop-it is a complex decision that has seri-
ous impacts on all farmers and on our food supply.2 " Therefore,
Geertson Seed Farms, beyond its procedural significance, highlights The
Framework's inadequacy in addressing systemic concerns raised by
those who must live with the unregulated crops in the environment.
Geertson Seed Farm's epilogue is disappointing, but illuminating. In
December of 2010, the APHIS issued its final EIS for glyphosate-toler-
ant alfalfa.220 In order to grant deregulation, Monsanto was required
to support its petition with the data required by regulation,2 2 ' which
includes descriptions of the plant biology, relevant experimental data,
field testing reports, as well as specific information about the regu-
lated article's weediness.2" The EIS found that complete alfalfa der-
egulation would not pose a threat to the environment for a number of
reasons. 223 It also noted that some deregulation data was incomplete,
requiring the USDA to make a variety of assumptions about the der-
egulation's impact.224
Next, though there is the possibility of gene transmission between
GE and non-GE alfalfa, the USDA was unconcerned, noting that test-
ing "is designed to provide seed lots where the [GE] transgene would
be very likely not to be detected in standard industry tests."225 The EIS
indentifies seed purity as a key issue for farmers and cites the efforts of
the National Alfalfa & Forage Alliance (NAFA) in developing best
management practices to avoid such seed contamination. Addition-
ally, through Monsanto's licensing agreement, farmers who use GE
alfalfa must abide by certain stewardship standards, such as mandatory
buffer zones.227 While opponents of GE crops may object to the USDA
deferring to an industry group to self-police, there is little reasonable
alternative. This finding highlights that people, and farmers in partic-
ular, play the central role in determining whether cross-contamina-
tion occurs.
218. Id. at 2755 ("Such harms, which the respondents will suffer even if their
crops are not actually infected with the Roundup ready gene, are suffi-
ciently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional
standing analysis").
219. Id.
220. APHIS, USDA, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events J101 and J163: Requests for
Non-Regulated Status, Final Environmental Impact Statement (Dec. 2010) [here-
inafter Alfalfa EIS.
221. 7 C.F.R. §340.6(c) (2011).
222. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222.
223. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 138.
224. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 107-9.
225. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at v, 27, 113-14.
226. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 115.
227. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 115, 122.
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Third, the USDA found no evidence that GE alfalfa would harm
other animals or plants.228 The biggest issue is whether increased use
of the pesticide glyphosate has an adverse impact on other plants and
animals.229 Glyphosate is a low-risk pesticide.so Though it has some
toxicity to amphibians, the USDA also noted that if farmers could not
use GE alfalfa, they might have to use more potent pesticides."' This
is precisely what GE alfalfa was developed to do,"' and it is comfort-
ing that the EIS validates this use of the technology.
Finally, the socioeconomic analysis required under the NEPA is
where the EIS is most interesting. It makes sense that the USDA would
be well aware of the environmental impact of a GE crop, but when it
receives notice of a regulated article, the notice has little to do with
socioeconomic impact." Therefore, when an EIS is prepared, it is
often the first full analysis of how a GE crop will impact the market-
place. In the case of alfalfa, the USDA is put in the unenviable posi-
tion of balancing a high quality GE-alfalfa crop with the potential loss
of an international market in non-GE alfalfa, along with the domestic
market for organic feed.234 The EIS acknowledges that conventional
alfalfa growers stand to lose significant income if their crops are con-
taminated with GE alfalfa. 235
The socioeconomic analysis focuses on consumers, noting
"[d]emand for GE foods or for foods free of GE content is very diffi-
cult to estimate." 236 The USDA attributes this difficulty to the lack of a
GE labeling law and notes "[in] ost U.S. consumers are unaware of the
prevalence of GE content in the U.S. food supply."237 As with seed
contamination, the EIS defers to a third party process to allay the fears
of consumers, citing the Non-GMO Project as an alternative way for
consumers to avoid GE crops, if they wish.238
While the alfalfa EIS is clearly thorough, it is limited by incomplete
data.2 3 In particular, the socioeconomic data seems most incomplete.
For example, the EIS acknowledges a lack of data on the consumer
228. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at v.
229. See Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at vi-vii.
230. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 139-42 (discussing the various impacts on ani-
mals and noting the pesticide is "practically non-toxic to birds," mammals
lose weight when exposed to glyphosate, and it is "slightly toxic to
amphibians.").
231. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 151-52 ("It is clear that glyphosate use is in-
creasing and glyphosate is more toxicologically and environmentally be-
nign than most of the pesticides that glyphosate may be replacing.").
232. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 4.
233. See supra pp. 22-23 and accompanying notes.
234. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 235, vii, 161.
235. See Cf Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 11.
236. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 62.
237. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 62-63.
238. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 65.
239. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 108.
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demand for GE-free foods.2 40 It also notes no "systematic data on al-
falfa forage consumption," which is necessary to understand the im-
pact GE-alfalfa has on export markets. 241 There was also no data on
the alfalfa sprouts' market, production of organic alfalfa for seed, or
conclusions regarding the impact of GE-alfalfa on those markets.24 2
These limitations ultimately have real impacts on agriculture, and in
particular organic agriculture.243 Whether those impacts will ever be
studied is unknown, as once a crop is deregulated there is no legal
requirement to track its continued impact on agriculture. 24 4
B. Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack: Equivalence Rules
As much as Geertson Seed Farms focused on cross-contamination and
the harm to organic and conventional farmers, GE sugar beet litiga-
tion sharpened the NEPA analysis to include consumer concerns.24 5
This makes sense because GE sugar beet helps meet market demand
for sugar.4 Unlike GE alfalfa, which is indirectly in the human food
chain, sugar from GE sugar beets is widely used in manufactured
foods.247
The GE sugar beet case facts concern several stages of plant devel-
opment, but also illustrate an emerging pattern of narrow review that
is inadequate under the NEPA."4 Mosanto and others developed a
glyphosate-resistant sugar beet and provided the required regulated
article notice to the APHIS under the PPA.2 49 In March of 2005, the
APHIS completely deregulated GE sugar beets. 5 o In September of
240. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 62.
241. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 43.
242. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 47, 52.
243. See generally, Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 55 (acknowledging the value that
Alfalfa has both as a high quality livestock feed but also because of the value
it aids to soil filth, fertility and structure).
244. There is, however hope for better regulatory science. USDA's National In-
stitute for Food and Agriculture has a Biotechnology Risk Assessment
Grants Program that supports "the generation of new information that will
assist Federal regulatory agencies in making science-based decisions about
the effects of introducing into the environment genetically engineered or-
ganisms." NIFA, USDA, Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program,
2012 Request for Applications, 5 (2012).
245. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
246. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F. 3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
247. Id. ("At present, the United States meets the considerable demand for do-
mestic refined sugar by producing refined sugar from domestic sugar beets
. . . [a]bout 449o of domestic refined sugar supply comes from sugar
beets.").
248. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
249. See Information Systems for Biotechnology, USDA Field Tests of GM Crops,
http://www.isb.vt.edu/search-release-data.aspx (Sugarbeat notice data)
(search on notices, then select organism "sugarbeet") (last visited Apr. 6,
2012); see alsoVilask, 636 F.3d at 1168.
250. APHIS, USDA, Monsanto Co. and KWS SAAT AG; Determination of Nonregu-
lated Status for Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide
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2009, the district court ruled that the deregulation decision violated
the NEPA.2 1' Next, in August of 2010, in the remedy phase of the
litigation, the court granted the Center for Food Safety's (CFS) re-
quest for vacatur, but denied a preliminary injunction.
Later in 2010, the court heard a preliminary injunction request
from the CFS after the APHIS permitted GE sugar beet stecklings25"
in remote areas. While the APHIS and Monsanto argued a prelimi-
nary injunction was improper because the CFS could not show harm,
since any harm from later cycles of genetically engineered sugar beet
plantings are "purely speculative." 25 4 Granting the preliminary injunc-
tion, the court found that the APHIS had "unlawfully segmented" the
steckling permits and failed to consider the cumulative impact of the
permits contrary to the NEPA. 255 Further, it noted that the CFS had
shown a likelihood of harm from the steckling plantings because
there were documented cases of contamination of organic or conven-
tional crops or cross-pollination.25" The court concluded that " [t] hese
incidents are too numerous . .. to declare confidently that these per-
mits provide sufficient containment to protect the environment. "257
The December 2010 district court decision can be described as a
scathing review of the APHIS and Monsanto. The APHIS improperly
segmented the permitting process, so that in the court's view, it could
take advantage of the categorical exclusion for the PPA regulated arti-
cle notices.' The court seemed most troubled by the APHIS and
Monsanto argument that the CFS could not show harm, and charac-
terized it as the parties "seeking to penalize the Plaintiffs, as well as the
environment, because the precise effects from these plantings are not
yet known."25' The court attributed the lack of precision to "APHIS'
Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,007 (Mar. 4, 2005); see also APHIS, USDA, Mon-
santo Co. and KWS SAAT AG; Availability of Petition and Environmental Assess-
ment for Determination of Nonregulated Status for Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered
for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 69 Fed. Reg. 61,466-67 (Dec. 20,
2004).
251. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
("In September 2009, the Court ruled that the decision by the United
States Department of Agriculture . . . and its Animal and Plant Health In-
spection Service . . . to deregulate a variety of genetically engineered sugar
beets without preparing an environmental impact statement ("EIS") vio-
lated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335
("NEPA").").
252. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 753 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
253. A steckling is a juvenile sugar beet. APHIS, USDA, About Roundup Ready
Sugarbeet (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech-
nology/sugarbeetabout.shtml.
254. Vilsack, 753 F.Supp.2d at 1055.
255. Id. at 1055-56.
256. Id. at 1056.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1055; see also USDA NEPA Implementing Procedures, Classification of
Actions, 7 C.F.R. §372.5(c) (3) (ii) (2012).
259. Vilsack, 753 F.Supp.2d at 1056.
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failure to conduct an environmental evaluation prior to issuing these
permits."260
The district court's decision was a CFS victory, but it was short-lived.
In February 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, vacat-
ing the preliminary injunction and reinstating the steckling per-
mits.2" The decision harkens back to a touchstone of The
Framework: when expert agencies conclude a GE crop is molecularly
the same as the conventional counterpart there is no need for addi-
tional regulation. 26 2 The Ninth Circuit described the sugar in this way:
"The sugar produced from Roundup Ready sugar beets is identical to
sugar processed from conventional sugar beets, and has been ap-
proved for food safety in the United States and the European
Union."2 " This language foreshadows the appellate court's rejection
of the district court's environmental concerns.2 64 Specifically, the ap-
pellate court found that the stecklings posed only "a negligible risk of
genetic contamination, as the juvenile plants are biologically incapa-
ble of flowering or cross-pollinating before February 28, 2011."265
Relying on Geertson Seed Farms, the appellate court found that the
APHIS' steckling permits "follow the [Geerston Seed Farm] blueprint"
because they sufficiently limit the risk of gene flow using strict condi-
tions. 66 Further, the appellate court rejected the notion that the CFS
could show harm based on the scientific evidence regarding cross-pol-
lination and contamination later in the sugar beet's growth cycle. 267
Finally, the court noted that the litigation was one small portion of a
larger issue.268 Today, the sugar beet deregulation decision is pending
with the APHIS, which has prepared an EIS and offered it for public
comment.2 6 9
Taken together, the GE alfalfa and sugar beet cases illustrate several
flaws in The Framework, or at least its implementation by the APHIS.
First, both cases raise doubts about whether the APHIS takes the
NEPA seriously enough. The APHIS's minimization of socioeconomic
260. Id. (quoting Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) ("Part of the
harm NEPA attempts to prevent in requiring an EIS is that, without one,
there may be little if any information about prospective environmental
harms and potential mitigating measures.")).
261. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F. 3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2010).
262. See id. at 1169, 1173.
263. Id. at 1169.
264. See id. at 1174.
265. Id. at 1173.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1173-74.
268. See id. at 1174.
269. APHIS, USDA, Environmental Impact Statement; Determination of Nonregulated
Status of Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glypho-
sate, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,969 (May 28, 2010).
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impacts of GE crop deregulation and its segmented approach to per-
mitting270 create an incomplete analysis of GE crops. This raises the
harder question of whether the APHIS is the appropriate agency to
consider the holistic, food system impact of GE crop deregulation. If
the answer is "no," then the question is, which agency should? The
Framework's approach of working within the established regulatory
scheme inevitably results in this fragmented approach. But in the ab-
sence of an agency and process that is tasked with the analysis of a GE
product's life cycle and its system-wide impacts, fragmentation should
not be surprising.
The second important shortcoming of The Framework illustrated
by the cases is the serious issue of crop coexistence. In a majority of
cases, we know that a company that registers a GE crop as a regulated
article intends to commercialize it.2 7' Yet in the alfalfa case, the
APHIS dismissed cross-contamination claims as unwarranted, both in
litigation and the final EIS, because the GE crop was safe and National
Organic Program requirements for buffer zones adequately protected
against cross-contamination. 22 Similarly, in the sugar beet cases the
APHIS appeared incapable of analyzing the impact of sugar beets
throughout their lifecycle, particularly on Swiss chard and table beet
crops. 7
To summarize the key deregulation cases, Geertson Seed Farns and
the sugar beet cases reveal basic principles of administrative law: the
agency is expert;27 4 judicial review of administrative agency's decision
is limited; 2 75 and the NEPA is a substantive requirement.2" At a
deeper level, they draw implicit conclusions going forward. Super-
weeds and contamination issues are significant. Consumer mistrust of
GE crops cannot be ignored. And most importantly, the courts' deci-
sions illustrate that The Framework is wholly unprepared to manage
issues of crop coexistence. Additional civil litigation illustrates just
how serious this problem is.
270. See discussion supra Section III A-B.
271. See APHIS, Petitions for Nonregulated Status Granted or Pending by APHIS, avail-
able at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/not-reg.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2012). There are a few exceptions for plants developed only for
research purposes.
272. Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222.
273. Supra note 252.
274. Cf Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F. 3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010)
("Plaintiffs give us little reason not to defer to APHIS's technical
expertise[.]").
275. See generally id.
276. See generally id.
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C. In re Genetically Modified Rice: Cross-Contamination Concerns
That bellwether trials were scheduled 277 to litigate farmers' damage
claims for GE rice contamination of conventional and organic crops is
not a good sign. In fact, the trials are further evidence that The
Framework has failed to adequately protect not only the environment,
but agriculture generally. In re Genetically Modified Rice"' represents
the practical impact of GE crop development on farmers and eco-
nomic markets. The case reveals weaknesses in the GE regulatory pro-
cess, and more particularly, GE material tolerance level in
conventional and organic crops. The case also cost Bayer $750 million
to settle.279
In 2006, the acting Agriculture Secretary, Mike Johanns, an-
nounced that a non-approved GE rice had been found in the Ameri-
can rice crop intended for human consumption domestically and
internationally.28s The GE rice, known as LLRICE 601, had not been
approved for commercialization at the time contamination was discov-
ered.281 As a result of the contamination, international markets re-
acted by requiring American long-grain rice exports be certified as
GE-free, and some shipments were rejected in Europe.2 12 Rice futures
dropped by fourteen percent following the announcement of LLRICE
601 contamination.28 " Additionally, the contamination was not lim-
ited to harvested crops as the unapproved GE rice was also detected in
a major rice seed, CL131.2" As a result, the USDA banned CL131
from further distribution and planting.2" Thus, the rice crop cross-
277. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 576
(2008) (explaining bellwether trials).
278. See In re Genetically Modified Rice, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1031-1034 (E.D.
Mo. 2009) adhered to on reconsideration, 4:06MD1811 CDP, 2011 WL 5024548(E.D. Mo. 2011).
279. GM Rice Settlement, BROWNGREER, PLC (July 2011), available at http://gm
ricesettlement.com./BYIUn-Secure/GMB Setlement.Agreement.pdf.
280. Tr. Of Remarks By Agric. Sec'y Mike Johanns and Dr. Robert Brackett, Director of the
Food & Drug Admin's Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, USDA (Aug.
18, 2006), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/!ut/p/c4/04
SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CPOosgAC9-wMJ8QYOMDpxBDAO9nXw9DFx
cXw2ALU_2CbEdFAF-soRU!/?printable=true&contentidonly= true&con-
tentid=2006%2FO8%2FO308.xml.
281. APHIS, USDA, Bayer CropScience; Extension of Determination of Nonregulated
Status to Rice Genetically Engineered for Glufosinate Herbicide Tolerance, 71 Fed.
Reg. 70360, 61 (Dec. 4, 2006).
282. Press Release, European Union, Commission Requires Certification of US Rice
Exports to Stop Unauthorised GMO Entering the EU (Aug. 23, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1120.
283. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 46, In re Genetically Modified
Rice, 2010 WL 3423761 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP).
284. Report of LibertyLink Rice Incidents, USDA (2007), available at http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/ 1 0/content/printable/RiceRe-
portlO-2007.pdf.
285. APHIS, USDA, Statement by Dr. Ron Dehaven regarding APHIS Hold on
Clearfield CL131 Long-grain Rice Seed (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.
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contamination harmed conventional farmers not just by devaluing
harvested rice, it significantly changed planting options and practices.
This scenario may sound familiar. Several years earlier, Starlink
Corn-a GE corn approved for animal consumption only-was detected
in Taco Bell-brand taco shells.2 86 According to the In re Genetically
Modified Rice plaintiffs, defendant Bayer was put on notice by the Star-
link experience of the "risks, dangers, and potential consequences" of
cross-contamination."' The rice case, which involves two GE crops:
LLRICE 601, which was retroactively deregulated, and LLRICE 604,
which was never approved, certainly tell a cautionary tale to GE crop
developers.2 8 8According to press reports cited in the farmers' com-
plaint, problems reached back to 2001 when problems with Aventis'
(Bayer's predecessor in ownership of the GE rice) GE rice required
burial of five million pounds of rice. 8 While it is unknown how the
rice contamination occurred, the bellwether trials involve plaintiff-
farmers from Mississippi and Arkansas. 29 0 The plaintiffs filed suit
under several liability theories, though the one most relevant here is
negligence per se based on violations of the PPA and its
regulations.2
In an early memorandum opinion, the court ruled that neither the
[PPA] ... nor the regulations issued under that act . .. allow any level
of adventitious presence of regulated articles. ... Thus, the court
granted summary judgment to the farmers on the defendants' affirm-
ative defenses that they were not liable because "they complied fully
with all applicable statutes and regulations."29 ' Further, in denying
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on punitive damages,
the court noted that defendant Bayer knew of cross-contamination
aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/03/gericeseedstatement.
shtml.
286. See Melinda Fulmer, Taco Bell Recalls Shells that Used Bioengineered Corn, L.A.
Times (Sept. 23, 2000), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/
23/news/mn-25314; see also Lucca Bucchini & Lynn R. Goldman, Starlink
Corn: A Risk Analysis, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 5, 6 (2002) (analyz-
ing the adequacy of Starlink approval process).
287. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 169, In re Genetically Modified
Rice, 2010 WL 3423761 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP).
288. In re Genetically Modified Rice, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014-15 (E.D. Mo.
2009) adhered to on reconsideration, 4:06MD1811 CDP, 2011 WL 5024548
(E.D. Mo. 2011).
289. See Steve Olafson, Biotech Rice to Feed Landfill, not the Hungry - Company Fears
Liability if Crop Shipped Abroad, HousTON CHRONICLE (May 18, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/2001_3305347/
biotech-rice-to-feed-landfill-not-the-hungry-compa.html.
290. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
291. Id. (listing causes of action including claims under North Carolina Unfair
Trade Practice Act, negligence, public and private nuisance, and negli-
gence per se under Mississippi and Arkansas law and noting the plaintiffs
were not pursuing strict liability theories).
292. Id. at 1004.
293. Id. 1014-15.
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risks from field tests and from human error.2" Further, the plaintiffs'
evidence established that Bayer knew that its GE rice had to be "iso-
lated, could not enter the food chain, and could not enter foreign
markets."295
The critical issue for this article is that the APHIS had represented
that there was a cross-contamination tolerance level. 29 ' As a result, the
industry tried to escape liability in reliance on tolerance levels.29 7 In
turn, In re Genetically Modified Rice emphasizes that The Framework is
ill equipped to protect organic and conventional farmers from eco-
nomic harm and consumers from choice of production method.2 9 8
While this is an expensive lesson for Bayer, it should also be another
warning to regulators that the system must be revised and improved.
D. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Assoc. v. Monsanto: The Last
Defense?
Society stands on the precipice of forever being bound to transgenic
agriculture and transgenic food . . the future of all food,
and indeed all agriculture [is]at stake."'
Whether or not the opening paragraph of novel litigation to rem-
edy the impact of GE crops resonates with its audience, it contains a
kernel of truth. As alfalfa, sugar beet, and rice litigation reveal, cross-
contamination of GE crops and conventional or organic crops has sig-
nificant societal impacts.300 Superweeds and loss of genetic diversity
illustrate the environmental toll. 0 ' Cross-contamination transcends
environmental concerns, encompassing the socioeconomic effect of
farmers who lose revenue due to crops that lose purity and cannot
command a premium on U.S. or world markets or are banned from
entry into some countries. 02 Consumer choice, though recognized by
the NEPA as a legitimate consideration, has never gained traction in
The Framework.o
294. Id. at 1021.
295. Id. 1021.
296. See supra note 5.
297. See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
298. Id.
299. Complaint at 11 Organic Seed Growers and Trade Assoc., v. Monsanto,
2011 WL 1126563 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011CV02163).
300. See supra note 50-51.
301. See supra pp. 4-5 and accompanying notes.
302. Compare Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 169 (noting some concerns in Japan
regarding GE alfalfa) with, APHIS, USDA, Glyphosate-Tolerant H7-1 Sugar
Beets, Draft Environmental Impact Statement 577-78 (Oct. 2011) (noting gen-
eral acceptance of GE sugar in certain markets).
303. Though this is understandable in light of cases such as one that struck
down a Vermont law requiring labeling of milk from cows treated with a
genetically engineered hormone because it violated commercial free
speech principles. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("We do not doubt that Vermont's asserted interest, the demand
of its citizenry for such information, is genuine; reluctantly, however, we
2012]1 143
144 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 1
The Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association, and approxi-
mately sixty other plaintiffs who are organic agriculture organizations,
organic farmers, or organic consumers, now seek a declaratory ruling
that "should they ever be contaminated by Monsanto's transgenic
seed, they need not fear being sued for patent infringement."3 0 4 This
preemptive move to prevent future patent litigation is in some ways
"back to the future" for conventional and organic farmers who found
themselves unable to prevent IPR enforceability in the agricultural
sector.o 5
This time, however, the landscape has changed. GE crop contami-
nation, as illustrated by In re Genetically Modified Rice, is no longer a
possibility, it is a reality.3 0 Pointing to Agriculture Secretary Vilsack's
acknowledgment of the economic harm to organic farmers from test-
ing costs and crop contamination, economic losses of $254 million in
the rice industry following the Liberty Link contamination, 0 ' and
health effects, 0 s the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to a declara-
tory judgment of patent invalidity, non-infringement, patent unen-
forceability, and no entitlement to remedy. 0 '
This case, at the very least, calls into question whether The Frame-
work and the NEPA should protect organic farmers, the environment,
and consumers or whether the plaintiffs are fighting a decades old
battle with no credible scientific evidence as ammunition. In the com-
plaint, the plaintiffs cite several studies that conclude glyphosate has
toxic and endocrine effects on mammals. 1 0 In another, the plaintiffs
offer evidence of links between glyphosate and non-Hodgkin's lym-
phoma, multiple myeloma, mammalian miscarriage, and the side ef-
fects in mammals that consume GE maize.3 "
conclude that it is inadequate. We are aware of no case in which consumer
interest alone was sufficient to justify requiring a product's manufacturers
to publish the functional equivalent of a warning about a production
method that has no discernable impact on a final product.").
304. Complaint at 12 Organic Seed Growers and Trade Assoc., v. Monsanto,
2011 WL 1126563 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011CV02163).
305. E.g. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) (finding the Plant
Variety Protection Act exemption for seed saving inapplicable to farmers
who saved GE seed with the intent to sell it to other farmers); Monsanto
Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding patent infringement
by farmer who saved seeds from previous years' crops).
306. See In re Genetically Modified Rice, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1012 (E.D. Mo.
2009).
307. Complaint at 187 Organic Seed Growers and Trade Assoc., v. Monsanto,
2011 WL 1126563 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011CV02163).
308. Id. at 1190-93.
309. Id. at 11131-50.
310. Id. at 190. (citing Richard Sophie, Differential Effects of Glyphosate and
Roundup on Human Placental Cells and Aromatase, 113 ENVIRON. HEALTH PER-
SPECTIVEs 716-72 (2005)).
311. Complaint at 190-93 Organic Seed Growers and Trade Assoc., v. Monsanto,
2011 WL 1126563 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 2011CV02163).
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Though this final example has no outcome (the court scheduled
oral argument on the motion to dismiss forJanuary 31, 2012)," the
mere fact of the litigation highlights The Framework's failures. After
twenty-five years, there are still debates over safety and deep mistrust
on both sides of the argument.313 Organic and conventional growers
have repeatedly participated in Federal Register calls to comment,
with few results.s" The APHIS has repeatedly given the NEPA short
shrift, resulting in litigation.3 1' The preceding cases are strong evi-
dence the The Framework should be revised with particular emphasis
on scientific integrity, regulatory science, systems-based analysis, and
careful reexamination of consumer choice issues. The next section
proposes concrete steps the federal government should take to create
a workable and sustainable Framework.
IV. REGULATORY SCIENCE AND REFORMING THE
FRAMEWORK
The Framework and the laws and regulations it rests upon should
be revisited in specific ways. This article does not advocate for adop-
tion of the precautionary principle to regulate GE crops, as has been
the norm in the European Union.31" Rather, it suggests ways to bal-
ance technological advancement with risk analysis in a more informa-
tive and balanced way, which some have referred to as de minimis
risk. 17
This final section does not advocate for or against GE crop use, but
suggests a system that reveals their true risks and actual benefits-to
the degree possible based on scientific capabilities." Given that GE
312. Docket, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Assoc., v. Monsanto, 2011 WL
1126563 (S.D.N.Y., 2011).
313. See Brian Vastag, Environmental Groups Call for Tighter Regulation of "Extreme
Genetic Engineering," WASH. PosT, Mar. 13 2012, http://www.washington
post.com/national/health-science/environmental-groups-call-for-tighter-
regulation-of-extreme-genetic-engineering/2012/03/13/gQAzKPZAS
story.html.
314. Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement Recommending the Deregu-
lation of Engineered Alfalfa, NATIONAL ORGANIC COALITION, Mar. 3, 2010,
http://truefoodnow.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/organic-signonltr-ge-al-
falfa-eis-3-march-2010.pdf.
315. See Rady Anada, Genetically Modified Crops and the Contamination of America's
Food Chain, GLOBALRESEARCH.CA, June 23, 2010, http://www.globalre-
search.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ANA20100623&ARTICle
Id=19860.
316. See VAN DER MUELEN, supra note 28 (explaining precautionary principle).
317. Durham & Doucet, supra note 49, at 63 ("The principle of de minimus risk
offers a reasonable counterweight to the overly zealous application of the
[precautionary principle] ... de minimus can effectively improve health and
welfare and at the same time avoid squandering resources in unintended
ways.").
318. See Agricultural Chemicals and Production Technology: Genetically Engineered
Crops, USDA, Apr. 27, 2005, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/AgChemi-
cals/geneticengineered.htm.
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crops have been developed over the last twenty-five years, 19 it seems
unlikely that they would suddenly disappear. Moreover, some argue
that GE crops hold the key to sustaining the earth's population.3 2 0 But
if GE crops are going to gain acceptance, then the regulatory para-
digm must shift. The following discussion first highlights how regula-
tory science provides a helpful paradigm for revising The Framework
and then makes specific suggestions for new approaches.
Modernizing The Framework should focus on regulatory science.
The hallmarks of high-functioning and effective regulatory science
are: 1) independence; 2) transparency; and 3) a public infrastructure
for science.321 These guiding principles provide a way to design a reg-
ulatory system for GE crops that recognizes, from the first regulated
article notice to the final deregulation petition, that these crops have
a significant impact on the human environment-including socioeco-
nomic issues-and that their regulation matters.
Today, The Framework coordinates the regulatory efforts of the
EPA, the USDA, and the FDA to assess GE crop safety, but it seems to
generate inadequate data. 2 Humans and animals consume the
crops, or they may be used for fuel, but all are grown on American
farms and affect the natural environment. In these simplistic terms, it
seems that The Framework should encourage data collection through-
out the GE crop's regulated life that assesses its public health, environ-
mental, and socioeconomic impact. However, how this data is
generated and analyzed should be given careful thought.
The USDA appears to be considering how to better regulate GE
crops, 2 though its focus falls short of what is needed. In late 2011,
the National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) issued its most
recent request for proposals for "biotechnology risk assessment re-
search."3 24 These grants will provide $4 million of program funds for
research that will identify better GE material risk management, moni-
toring, and environmental assessment methods.325 The program also
funds research of gene transmission rates. 2 However, the program
specifically excludes funding for projects studying health risk assess-
ment or "risk management of humans or domestic food animals ex-
319. Id.
320. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
321. RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS 8-9 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds.,
2006).
322. See supra text accompanying note 6.
323. See Letter from Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture, USDA, to Stakehold-
ers (Dec. 2010) http://www.usda.gov/documents/GEAlfalfa-to-stakehold-
ers-201ODec.pdf.
324. USDA, Biotechnology Risk Assessment Research Grants Program, available at
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/fo/biotechnologyriskassessment.cfm (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2012).
325. Id. In FY 2010, grants funded under this program totaled $6,124,175; FY
2009 $3,714,643.
326. Id.
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posed to GE organisms [and] social and economic research."S2 7 Thus,
while the USDA and Congress 328 recognize the need for better infor-
mation regarding GE crop risks, they have precluded funding the
study of what are likely the two most important issues to consumers:
health and cost. Though this example of current federal financial
support of GE crop research may be shortsighted, that does not pre-
clude imagining what would produce better information for
regulators.
Scientific independence is central to the success of any GE crop
evaluation. 2 Independence is important because "the scientific pro-
cess will generate more reliable information more quickly if it is al-
lowed to function . .. free of external political or financial momentum
pushing toward one outcome or another."3 0 In part, the mistrust and
skepticism surrounding GE crop deregulation may be because GE
crop developers are responsible for evaluating its safety, rather than
requiring an independent assessment.331 Furthermore, these safety
studies are not easily accessible to the public, nor are there easily ac-
cessible reviews of the safety studies submitted in support of deregula-
tion petitions. 32 In turn, this leads to concerns over transparency.
Simply put, "[t] ransparency is a tool for increasing political ac-
countability."33 3 Openness of data and scientific study of GE crops is
327. Id.
328. USDA is authorized to administer the Biotechnology Risk Assessment
Grants (BRAG) by 7 U.S.C. §5921, 7901 (2006).
329. Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo & Margriet Caswell, Genetically Engineered Crops in
the United States (USDA EcoNOMIc REsEARcH SERVICE, EcoNOMic INFORMA-
TION BULLETIN No.11 2006) ("The National Academy of Sciences also is-
sued a report that made recommendations suggesting that regulation
'could be improved further' by making the process more 'transparent and
rigorous' by enhanced scientific peer review, solicitation of public input,
and 'more explicit presentation of data, methods, analyses, and
interpretations"').
330. Holly Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The Importance of Trans-
parency in Natural Resource Collection, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS,
143 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, eds. 2006).
331. See e.g. ANDREW KIMBRELL, YOUR RIGHT TO KNow 49 (2007) ("...new GE
crops are being rubber-stamped by federal agencies despite evidence that
proves these crops will contaminate native and conventional plants and
pose other significant new environmental threats."); FOOD & WATER
WATCH, Genetically Engineered Food: An Overview 8 (2011), available at www.
foodandwaterwatch.org (noting "independent, peer-reviewed research ...
revealed some troubling health implications).
332. Editorial, Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop Research? Sa. Am. (Aug. 2009),
available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-seed-
companies-control-gm-crop-research (discussing the scientists' concerns
over restrictions that seed developers place on GE crop research and not-
ing "[t]he group has submitted a statement to the EPA protesting that 'as a
result of restricted access, no truly independent research can be legally con-
ducted on many critical questions regarding the technology."').
333. Wagner & Steinzor, supra note 322, at 144. But see Sheila Jasanoff, Trans-
parency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69 L. & CONTEMPORARY
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essential to the regulatory process because it allows for rigorous sci-
ence that can be replicated and validated.1 4 This transparency is most
critical to everyday citizens.s3 ' Though the USDA clearly requires sub-
stantial safety evidence before it permits planting... or before it der-
egulates a crop, 3 the public has little understanding of this science.
Adopting regulatory requirements to share data, or at least provide it
to an independent research entity, would help the public understand
how GE crops change the human and natural environment because
such an entity could generate meta-analysis or other broad scale study
of GE crops that could be released in the public domain."'
Currently, the evidence shows that GE crops have caused
superweeds, but the more pressing concern for skeptics of the tech-
nology's safety is whether there are unknown and unseen impacts. 3
Greater transparency that is appropriate to its audience and that iden-
tifies the level of scientific certainty of GE crop safety can also result in
better science that answers these questions.34 0 As research reveals
more about gaps in GE crop safety to human, environmental, or eco-
nomic health, scientists can also develop methods to fill those gaps.
Difficult economic times may make proposing a new federal pro-
gram or approach seem improvident, but it is not if the result is a
better functioning regulatory system. Funding public science-whether
conducted by government entities or private entities with federal dol-
lars-is key to reforming The Framework. Without attention to "a pub-
lic infrastructure for science" the tenets of independence and
PROBLEMS 21, 26 (2006) (noting "openness and transparency in science,
then, cannot be treated as absolute goods. Rather, the degree of openness
is context-specific and needs to be traded off against other important social
values. The problem for contemporary law and policy is to develop princi-
pled approaches to maintaining the desired balance.").
334. Wagner & Steinzo, supra note 322, at 15.
335. SeeJasanoff, supra note 3343, at 27 (stating that questions of transparency
should be considered in the context of who needs or wants transparency).
336. See generally, Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo & Margriet Casewell, supra note 3309
at 4 (describing the process of USDA's APHIS for authorizing field test of
agricultural biotechnology products).
337. See generally, Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo & Margriet Casewell, supra note 330
at 4 (describing the process of USDA's APHIS for authorizing field test of
agricultural biotechnology products).
338. With provisions to protect confidentiality of trade secret or proprietary
information.
339. See Mathilde Bourrier, Applying Safety Science to Genetically Modified Agricul-
ture, in GOVERNING RISK IN GM AGRICULTURE 261 (Michael Baram & Ma-
thilde Bourrier, eds. 2011) (noting that because NGOs and anti-GMO
groups are compiling information on the risks of GM agriculture, industry
should "organize at a more macro level to set up its own forum of exchange
and data collection, notably on unwanted and adverse events.").
340. SeeJasanoff, supra note 334, at 27-8; see Scott M. Lassman, Transparency and
Innuendo: An Alternative to Reactive Over-Disclosure, 69 L. & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 69, 70 (discussing the problem disclosing research that is still of
unknown significance and the problem of failure to protect proprietary
information.).
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transparency have little chance of creating better regulatory out-
comes.341 Without better regulatory outcomes, systems like The
Framework become a drag on the economy (because of litigation
costs or other externalities) de-incentivizing innovation while at the
same time alienating the public.
The principles of independence, transparency, and publically sup-
ported science also provide a framework for evaluating what went
wrong in Geertson Seed Farms. For example, if these principles were The
Framework's foundation, then data regarding safety, environmental,
and socioeconomic impact could be developed from the time the GE
crop is a regulated article under the Plant Protection Act (PPA)."'
However, in Geertson Seed Farms and Center for Food Safety, the court re-
quired the USDA to prepare an environmental impact statement
given the "novel" concerns about environmental safety-after deregula-
tion had already occurred."' Had the the USDA's original goal been
to develop an independent, transparent body of science during the
crop's regulated life, "novel" concerns raised at deregulation could
have been precluded. Even with this approach, it is important to real-
ize that one "novel" question-what happens to environmental and
human health after a GE crop is deregulated-is wholly unaccounted
for in The Framework. 4 4
The Framework could require study of GE crops' impact on the
human and natural environment during the regulated period. The
deregulation process is too late to begin asking important NEPA-like
questions, which are questions that have persisted for years. The der-
egulation cases identify safety concerns raised by some farmers since
the intellectual property right cases of the 1980s and 1990s: crop and
soil contamination.345 Again, these persistent issues, which remain
largely unresolved,346 support the idea of modifying The Framework
in anticipation of deregulation petitions. However, to maintain inde-
pendence, the federal government should consider mechanisms that
require applicants to pay for public science that gathers this data, such
as application fees.
The Framework should also require consistent evaluation of GE
crop safety through standard methodology that is easily compared
341. Wagner & Steinzor, supra note 322, at 18-19.
342. Jeffrey C. Lerner, Ph.D., Rescuing Science from Politics: Regulation and the Dis-
tortion of Scientific Research Wendy Waner & Rena Steinzor, 28 J. LEGAL MED.
283, 285 (2007) (book review).
343. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, 2007 WL 776146 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
344. See id.
345. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010) ("Re-
spondents in this case brought suit under the APA to challenge a particular
agency order: APHIS's decision to completely deregulate RRA.").
346. Genetic Engineering & Corporate Control of our Seed Supply, FARM AID http://
www.farmaid.org/site/c.qll5IhNVJsE/b.2739785/apps/s/content.asp?ct=
3851575 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
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across crops and issues.34 7 While much of the early debate over GE
crops focused on human and environmental health questions, the sci-
ences of agricultural and consumer economics are no less relevant. 348
For example, continuing debates over intellectual property issues, the
antitrust listening sessions, and the existence of seemingly incompati-
ble farming techniques (GE, organic, and conventional) indicate that
physical science is not the only relevant data point during the crop's
regulated life. Therefore, a more inclusive regulatory science inquiry
is appropriate, as illustrated by Geerston Seed Farms and Center for Food
Safety.349 The next sections recommend ways for The Framework to be
more inclusive and holistic.
A. Begin NEPA-Like Analysis at the Notice Stage
First, agencies approving GE crops should consider amending the
PPA and its related regulations to require analysis of the NEPA, or
NEPA-like, criteria from the notice stage forward. Further, GE tech-
nology owners should bear some responsibility for generating and up-
dating data that answers NEPA-like questions (though the analysis of
that data should not be conducted solely by the technology owners).
This does not suggest that an environmental impact statement (EIS)
should be performed when the APHIS receives notice of a regulated
article. It does mean that the APHIS's notice or permit process should
set requirements that allow either the agency or the technology owner
to develop a record and data sets over the regulated life of the crop in
anticipation of a deregulation petition. This reform's purpose is to
begin data capture at the beginning of the crop's commercial life so
that it could be consistently analyzed in the broader agricultural, so-
cioeconomic, and environmental contexts.
The need for including NEPA-like criteria in the permitting/notice
process under the PPA is illustrated by the lack of data the USDA con-
sistently refers to in its environmental assessments and environmental
347. See Durham & Doucet, supra note 49, at 65 (2011) (arguing the validity of
technological assessment "requires the development of measurement stan-
dards to allow for objective and systematic comparisons.").
348. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Report on Genetically Engineered Crops 26
(2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=12804
&page=1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (noting the incompatibility of eco-
nomic research made it difficult to draw conclusions regarding economic
impacts and stating "Each study has its own strengths and limitations. For
example, some studies may use a different guideline in judging the signifi-
cance (i.e., confidence level) of factors affecting the adoption of GE crops
compared to other studies. The committee could not make the various
studies comparable and accepted each set of findings as valid evidence.
Some of the general approaches used to estimate economic impacts are
explained here.").
349. Id.
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impact statements for alfalfa and sugar beets.s"o In both cases, the
courts identified that there were serious questions regarding
superweeds and cross-contamination that needed analysis prior to der-
egulation."' In both cases, the APHIS suggested that it would take
time and effort to gather this information.' This raises the question
of why regulation is not designed to develop a holistic picture of a GE
crop's impact from the first time it is planted. Finally, it is reasonable
to anticipate that data gaps exist and every concern may not be ana-
lyzed. However, with each EIS or environmental assessment (EA), the
USDA gains insight into what data is lacking. This presents the oppor-
tunity to close existing data gaps for future crops with better regula-
tory science.
B. Improve and Standardize Evaluation Methodology
Second, as illustrated by inadequate EAs and EISs with gaps, the
regulatory science used to evaluate GE crops should be reevaluated.
Doubts about GE crop safety are prolonged by poorly understood reg-
ulatory processes, and the science that informs them, and the lack of
transparency in the data. If the government adopted the suggestion to
capture more NEPA-related information and data while the crops are
regulated, then the government also should examine the purpose and
methodology of the evaluation process. For example, one lingering
issue for GE crop acceptance is its safety.' Scientists do not agree
that GE crops are safe, nor do consumers, yet regulators have defini-
tively asserted that they are.3 ' Developing a regulatory system that
clearly identifies the type and methodology of scientific study could
improve public understanding of GE crops.
350. E.g., Alfalfa EIS, supra note 222, at 43 ("APHIS was unable to locate com-
plete and systematic data on alfalfa forage in the United States . . ."); 43
("APHIS was unable to find data on the national distribution of the con-
sumption of alfalfa among its various uses."); 53 ("APHIS was unable to
locate any publically available sales data for alfalfa sprouts."); 58 (APHIS
was unable to estimate the demand for organic alfalfa seed .. .); 93 ("Some
of the data on the effects of deregulation of GT alfalfa are incomplete" and
noting that that in these cases APHIS makes conservative assumptions.).
APHIS, USDA, Glyphosate-Tolerant H7-1 Sugar Beets: Request for Nonregulated
Status, Draft Environmental Impact Statement 180 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/sugarbeet.shtml (last visited
Feb. 3, 2012) ("The acreage and location of table beet seed being produced
by home gardeners is unknown."); 208 ("Whether home gardeners would
use the same careful evaluation of plant traits as commercial growns to re-
move off-types is unknown); 444 ("The percentage of producers who might
switch to the steckling method and the associated costs of switching meth-
ods are unknown."); 483 ("Second, the formulations are proprietary intro-
ducing an additional unknown into the comparison.").
351. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2747 (2010).
352. See id. at 2758.
353. See Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in Ge-
netically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 268 (2001).
354. See id. at 292.
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A review of the regulatory science requires experts on both sides of
the issue to come to a consensus about how these crops should be
evaluated for public health and environmental safety and for how
long. Further, the science should adhere to a consistent methodology
so that it can be easily compared, analyzed, and challenged if neces-
sary. Additionally, an increased emphasis on regulatory science could
also increase consumer confidence in the process. As it stands now,
consumers and GE crop opponents regularly criticize GE crop ap-
proval for relying on the science generated by the crop owner and
reviewed by people who may have worked for that owner at another
time.ss' The lack of objective science and the existence of the "revolv-
ing door" lead lay people to conclude that the system is not transpar-
ent, or worse, it is rigged to promote GE crops."
C. Require Crop Co-existence Plans and Develop Remedies for
Contamination
Third, Framework revisions must address crop coexistence. Once
GE crops are deregulated, they become part of everyday agriculture.
The difficulty with this situation is that cross-contamination of conven-
tional or organic crops with GE crops can be economically and envi-
ronmentally devastating to the conventional or organic farmer.' A
farmer may lose the price premium commanded by a non-GE crop. 5
Additionally, the farmer, especially the organic farmer, has to deal
with decontaminating the land, which may mean loss of organic certi-
fication for a time. Moreover, as noted in Geerston Seed Farms, requiring
conventional and organic farmers to test for purity is a cost that consti-
tutes a legal harm sufficient to establish standing.
Crop coexistence policy should not put the burden on organic or
conventional farmers to avoid GE cross-contamination. This may
mean that GE crops, even when deregulated, must comply with stan-
dardized buffer zones or other methods to reduce the potential for
cross-contamination. Additionally, thought must be given to whether
there is a better way to remedy cross-contamination than cases like In
355. See id. at 288.
356. See id. at 287.
357. See Lisa A. Cutts, What's the Big Deal? The Let-Down That Is th Lankmark Mon-
santo v. Geertson, 20 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 117, 147 (2011).
358. Catherine Green & Katherine Smith, Can Genetically Engineered and Organic
Crops Coexist?, 25 CHOICES 2, 4 (Agricultural & Applied Economics Associ-
ation), Oct. 2010, at 1, 4 ("Despite producer efforts to avoid GE contamina-
tion, one of the top organic and non-GE grain wholesalers in the United
States reports that it's rejecting an increasing percentage of the arriving
loads because they test higher than 0.9% for genetically engineered mate-
rial. When a load is rejected, a producer loses their organic or non-GE
price premium for the product, incurs additional trucking costs for trans-
portation to a buyer who purchases GE grain, and may have other losses."),
available at http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/policy/choices/20102/2010
214/2010214.pdf.
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re Genetically Engineered Rice. That case generated high costs in several
ways: attorneys' fees, use of judicial resources, uncertainty in the rice
market, and continued concerns about cross-contamination.
While the perimeters of a remedial program that compensates
farmers for GE crop cross-contamination is a topic for another article,
there are several models that could be examined. For example, The
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program was established to en-
sure that vaccine technology advanced without risk of tort claims ban-
krupting pharmaceutical companies.' At the same time, parents
were assured a specialized process that would avoid years of litigation
and expense to receive compensation." 0 Funded by an excise tax on
vaccines, the Vaccine Injury Trust Fund is one way to promote a pub-
lic health measure that will generate some adverse outcomes.3 '
Another model is found in state oil discharge funds that place a small
tax on fuel sales ($0.0125 per imported gallon) in order to establish a
fund to assist cleanup of accidental fuel oil discharge into the environ-
ment.362 In both examples, a product that has entered the market-
place as "safe" also poses public or environmental health risks.
Creating a fund based on a small tax to GE seed distributors or pur-
chasers could ameliorate the harm to conventional and organic grow-
ers without requiring them to litigate their claims in court.
D. Reconsider Labeling GE Foods
Fourth, Congress should reconsider whether to mandate GE food
labeling. While some may feel the established legal position that a GE
food is just like its conventional counterpart makes sense, after twenty-
five years consumers have still not adopted this view, 63 and given the
size of the Just Label It! movement, may never. The average consumer
finds it difficult to believe that a crop engineered to be glyphosate-
tolerant is the same as a conventional, non-glyphosate tolerant
crop.' Additionally, simply allowing consumers to rely on organic
359. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-660)
(1988).
360. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
10 (establishing the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
which pays compensation for vaccine related injury or death).
361. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15 (2012) ("(4) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), payments of compensation under the Program shall be determined on
the basis of the net present value of the elements of the compensation and
shall be paid from the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund estab-
lished under section 9510 of Title 26 in a lump sum . . .").
362. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 146-D & E (2012) (establishing a fund for the
cleanup of oil spills).
363. See Right to Know, JUST LABEL IT! (Mar. 28, 2012), http://justlabelit.org/
right-to-know/ ("Yet polls have repeatedly shown that the vast majority of
Americans, - over 90% in most studies - believe [genetically engineered]
foods should be labeled.").
364. Id.
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labeling as a proxy for GE crop labels may limit consumer choice due
to the comparatively high cost of organics."'* Most of all, adopting a
simple label icon for GE containing products will provide concrete
evidence of whether consumers really care by generating comparative
sales data for GE and non-GE products.
E. Creating Honest Outcomes. Establish a Center for Excellence in Crop and
Food Innovation
If industry wants to see GE crop technology gain worldwide accept-
ance, it would be wise to support such a Framework review. The over-
all goal should be to settle, to the best ability of science, whether GE
crops are safe for the human and natural environment. The federal
government could choose to adopt all four proposed changes above
and house the entire GE crop review, approval, and labeling process
in a Center for Excellence in Crop and Food Innovation. Such a
center could consolidate the regulatory function of the EPA, the FDA,
and the USDA under one roof and perform the important task of
consistently analyzing the scientific, socioeconomic, and other rele-
vant impacts of GE crops. Such a center should be multi-disciplinary
and holistic in its approach to evaluating GE crops.
The final consideration is honesty. As Professor Wagner points out,
regulators often use science as a way to obscure the underlying policy
choices they make. 66 At twenty-five years old, The Framework repre-
sents a reasonable approach to regulating a new technology. However,
after twenty-five years into the GE crop endeavor, there is enough ex-
perience and evidence to warrant amendments that will benefit indus-
try, farmers, consumers, and the environment for the next twenty-five
years. Failure to consider reforms will result in continued litigation,
consumer mistrust, and unwarranted environmental degradation
from cross-contamination and superweeds.
365. Cf William K. Hallman & Helen L. Aquino, Consumers'Desire for GM Labels:
Is the Devil in the Detais?, 20(4) CHoicEs 217, 220-21 (American Agricultural
Economics Association) (2005) ("[S]ince most Americans know very little
about the technology, even simple declarative sentences about the pres-
ence of GM ingredients on a food label are likely to cause the product to be
rejected by consumers. This is consistent with the position of opponents of
mandatory labeling who argue that in the absence of any evidence that GM
products are inferior or unsafe, any label that causes consumers to believe
otherwise is misleading. The effect of such labels would be to cause con-
sumers to reject foods made with GM ingredients, thereby reducing real
consumer choice.").
366. Wagner & Steinzor, supra note 322, at 15 ("By looking to science for an-
swers and representing the results as if they were pre-ordained by science or
are the only credible outcomes of a technical analysis, decision makers
hope to avoid attack by angry interest groups.").
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V. CONCLUSION
The Framework governing GE crops is twenty-five years old." De-
spite the commercial success of some crops in the U.S., many consum-
ers, conventional farmers, and organic farmers reject GE crops as
unsafe for the environment, unhealthy for human and animals, and
unnatural.368 The regulatory system for deregulating crops has inade-
quately generated data and has generated decisions that have not
stemmed the tide of opposition."' Because it is unlikely that GE crop
developers will remove these crops from the American market, 7 o the
American focus should be on revising The Framework based on prin-
ciples of regulatory science. A better regulatory system that values in-
dependent science and transparency will benefit industry and
consumers.' Without revisions to The Framework, developers and
the government should expect consumers, farmers, and citizens to
continue rejecting GE crops.
367. See Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986).
368. See Phillip J. Dale, Public Concerns Over Transgenic Crops, 9 GENOME RES.
1159, 1161 (1999) (providing a table of common concerns motivating con-
sumers to reject GE crops).
369. See supra note 351 and accompanying text (providing a number of instances
where the current body of data is insufficient); see also supra Section I.B.
(surveying recent judicial decisions), and JUST LABEL IT!, supra note 564
(demonstrating continued consumer concern regarding GE crops).
370. Though this has been the case in Europe, where Monsanto removed its GE-
maize from the French market and German company BASF abandoned
marketing all GE crops in Europe due to consumer backlash. See Nathan
Gray, Monsanto Scraps GM Maize in France, FOODNAVIGATOR (Feb. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.foodnavigator.com/Financial-Industry/Monsanto-
scraps-GM-maize-in-France; Nathan Gray, BASF pulls out of European GM
Market, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.foodnavi-
gator.com/Financial-Industry/BASF-pulls-out-of-European-GM-market.
371. See supra pp. 40-41 (describing some of the shortcomings of The
Framework).
372. SeeJusT LABEL IT!, supra note 564 (exemplifying the strength of the current
consumer movement in calling for the revision of the regulatory framework
surrounding GE crops).
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